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 THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT 
Andrew Jay McClurg* 
Abstract 
Only two constitutional rights—the First and Second Amendments—
have a realistic capacity, through judicial interpretation or legislative 
action or inaction, to confer a “right to be negligent” on private citizens; 
that is, a right to engage in objectively unreasonable risk-creating conduct 
without legal consequences. In the First Amendment context, for 
example, the Supreme Court, in New York Times v. Sullivan and its 
progeny, expressly embraced a right to be negligent in defaming public 
officials and public figures to protect speech. This Article asserts that 
through both common and statutory law, the United States has enshrined 
a de facto Second Amendment right to be negligent in many aspects of 
making, distributing, and possessing firearms, the only legal product 
designed to inflict what the tort system is designed to prevent.  
Explaining that it is a microcosm of a much larger issue, this Article 
focuses on one area: allowing access to guns by criminals through theft. 
Hundreds of thousands of guns are stolen each year from individuals and 
commercial sellers. By definition, they all go directly to criminals. A 
substantial percentage of guns used in crime were previously stolen. 
Nevertheless, the common law has conferred near complete immunity on 
gun owners and sellers who fail to secure guns from theft when they are 
subsequently used to cause harm. This occurs despite frequent judicial 
pronouncements that the risk of firearms demands the highest degree of 
care in their use and keeping. To accomplish this result, courts ignore or 
mischaracterize fundamental scope of liability principles, rarely even 
reaching the question of whether reasonable care was exercised. 
On the statutory front, not only have Congress and most states failed 
to mandate firearms security measures, Congress has—in the name of the 
Second Amendment—given express protection of the right to be 
negligent, most prominently in the form of the Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act. The Act immunizes manufacturers and sellers 
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of guns from most tort claims, including claims against commercial 
firearms licensees for negligent security leading to theft. 
This Article argues that this government-endorsed lack of 
responsibility results in the under-deterrence of risky conduct that, with 
reasonable alterations, could avoid substantial intentional and accidental 
injury costs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Only two federal constitutional rights—the First and Second 
Amendments—have the realistic capacity, through judicial interpretation 
or legislative action, to confer a “right to be negligent” on private citizens; 
that is, a right to engage in objectively unreasonable, risk-creating 
conduct without legal consequences.1 In the First Amendment context, 
                                                                                                                     
 1. “Realistic capacity” means as a practical matter under existing principles of law. In 
response to a draft of this Article, Professor Eugene Volokh constructed four creative 
hypotheticals to challenge my assertion that only the First and Second Amendments have the 
capacity, through judicial interpretation, to confer a right to be negligent on private actors. See E-
mail from Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, to author 
(Mar. 31, 2015, 23:56 CST) (on file with author). Each hypothetical involved injuries inflicted by 
a third-party criminal actor as a consequence, at least in part, of an asserted “negligent” act. Those 
acts were, respectively: a man invoking his Fourth Amendment rights in response to a police 
request to read his email, a woman getting an abortion, a woman entering into a lesbian 
relationship, and a property owner failing to institute a state-of-the-art security system that 
employed race and sex profiling. Each hypothetical contained facts assuming that the subsequent 
criminal harm was a foreseeable consequence of the act in question. Professor Volokh conceded 
it was unlikely any of the acts would result in tort liability but asserted that such results would 
occur at least in part because of constitutional considerations. For space considerations and 
because my assertion is not essential to the thesis of this Article, the hypotheticals and detailed 
2
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for example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
and its progeny, expressly endorsed a right to be negligent in defaming 
public officials and public figures to protect free speech.2 This Article 
asserts that, through both common and statutory law,3 the United States 
has enshrined a de facto Second Amendment right to be negligent 
regarding many aspects of making, distributing, and possessing firearms, 
the only legal product designed to inflict what the tort system is intended 
to prevent: death and injury to human beings.4 “Right to be negligent,” as 
used herein, refers to government-sanctioned behavior that fails rational 
applications of risk–utility balancing—the dominant test for assessing the 
reasonableness of conduct and risks under U.S. tort law.5 A consequence 
                                                                                                                     
discussion of them are omitted here. They are, however, worth reading and pondering and are 
available on request (Professor Volokh has given permission). 
My reply questioned whether the hypotheticals involved cognizable negligent acts under 
existing principles of tort law. See E-mail from author, to Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz 
Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Apr. 1, 2015, 10:37 CST) (on file with author). While the 
definition of what constitutes unreasonable conduct is, of course, amorphous, it seems unlikely 
(and no relevant cases exist of which I am aware) that invoking a constitutional right, having an 
abortion, engaging in a lesbian relationship, or failing to build race and sex profiling into a 
property security system would be seen as objectively unreasonable acts that fail a risk–utility 
balancing analysis. Additionally, even if one or more of the hypothesized acts were considered to 
be negligent, traditional scope of liability principles would most likely preclude liability because 
the hypothesized criminal acts were not what made the original act negligent in the first place, at 
least absent the unusual facts assumed in the hypotheticals. Nevertheless, Professor Volokh’s 
point is theoretically accurate, which prompted me to add the qualifier “realistic” to the sentence 
in text.  
 2. 376 U.S. 254, 279–88 (1964) (imposing the high hurdle of the “actual malice” test in 
defamation actions brought by public officials, which requires plaintiffs to prove the defendant 
knew the statements were false or published them in reckless disregard of whether they were true 
or false); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730–31 (1968) (holding that proving 
“reckless disregard” under the actual malice test requires evidence that the defendant subjectively 
“entertained serious doubts as to the truth of” the statements and noting that this is a higher 
standard than an objective test of reasonableness); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–
64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (extending the actual malice test to public figures). 
 3. “Statutory law” refers both to affirmative statutory protections for negligent conduct 
and the omission of statutes or regulations mandating safe conduct. 
 4. This Article refers to “guns” and “firearms” generally, but the clear focus is on 
handguns, the firearm of choice for committing homicide. Handguns were used in 5782 deaths 
(68%) of the 8454 firearm homicides in 2013 for which the type of firearm could be determined. 
Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States 2013 Expanded Homicide Data Table 8, FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-
in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_ 
data_table_8_murder_victims_by_weapon_2009-2013.xls (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).  
 5. Negligence under tort law is assessed by balancing the risks of conduct—both the 
foreseeability of the risk manifesting itself in harm and the severity of the harm should it occur—
against the burden of eliminating or substantially reducing the risk. The standard is captured in 
the definition of negligence in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
3
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of this government-endorsed (and, in some situations, enforced) lack of 
responsibility is the under-deterrence of behavior that, with reasonable 
alterations, could avoid significant intentional and accidental injury 
costs.6  
To allow in-depth examination, this Article focuses on only one aspect 
of the issue: preventing access to guns by criminals through theft.7 
Hundreds of thousands of guns are stolen each year from individuals and 
commercial sellers.8 By definition, all stolen guns go directly to 
criminals. A large percentage of guns used in crime were previously 
stolen.9 Nevertheless, despite frequent judicial pronouncements that the 
magnitude of the risk presented by firearms demands the highest degree 
of care in their use and keeping,10 the common law has conferred near 
complete immunity on gun owners and sellers who fail to act reasonably 
to secure guns from theft when the guns are subsequently used to inflict 
                                                                                                                     
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under 
all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the 
person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the 
person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that 
may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010). The standard is an iteration of Judge Learned Hand’s formula for negligence in United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), where Judge Hand said conduct is 
negligent if the burden of avoiding a risk is less than the probability of the risk times the severity 
of the harm. Id. at 173 (“[I]t serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if 
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is 
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL.”).  
 6. See infra notes 205–32 and accompanying text. 
 7. Preventing unauthorized access to firearms is an area in which I have a longstanding 
interest. See generally Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the 
Negligent Storage of Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189 (2000) [hereinafter McClurg, Armed and 
Dangerous] (arguing for recognition of a “negligent storage” claim under tort law when one fails 
to act reasonably to secure a firearm that is subsequently acquired and used to cause harm by an 
unauthorized user); Andrew J. McClurg, The Public Health Case for the Safe Storage of 
Firearms: Adolescent Suicides Add One More “Smoking Gun,” 51 HASTINGS L.J. 953 (2000) 
(arguing for safe gun storage laws as a way to reduce adolescent suicides); Andrew J. McClurg, 
Child Access Prevention Laws: A Common Sense Approach to Gun Control, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 47 (1999) [hereinafter McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws] (arguing for the adoption 
and enforcement of laws criminalizing the negligent storage of firearms in situations where a 
minor acquires the gun and uses it to cause harm). Parts of this Article are drawn from these prior 
works. 
 8. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 2012 
SUMMARY: FIREARMS REPORTED LOST AND STOLEN 5–6 (2013), https://www.atf.gov/file/11846/ 
download [hereinafter 2012 ATF STOLEN GUNS REPORT] (finding that 183,660 firearms were 
reported stolen in 2012); see infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.   
 10. See infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text. 
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harm.11 Accomplishing that result requires courts to ignore or 
mischaracterize fundamental scope of liability principles. Courts 
rejecting liability in theft cases rarely even reach the question of whether 
the defendants acted reasonably, choosing instead to hide behind the 
avoidance mechanisms of “no duty” or “no proximate cause.” 
On the statutory front, Congress and most state legislatures have not 
only declined to pass laws aimed at reducing gun thefts, Congress has 
given explicit protection to the right to be negligent in securing firearms 
in the form of the Child Safety Lock Act of 200512 and, more 
prominently, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 
(PLCAA).13 The former immunizes individual gun owners from suit in 
theft cases if they employ childproofing devices such as trigger locks that 
do not deter theft,14 while the latter bars all claims for negligent security 
against licensed firearms dealers.15 
Thieves are but one type of unauthorized, dangerous firearms user. 
Each year, hundreds of minors are killed and thousands more injured in 
accidental shootings.16 Hundreds more die using a gun to commit 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See infra Part II.   
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(1) (2012).  
 13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012). 
 14. See infra notes 75–79, 155–64 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 196–201 and accompanying text. 
 16. Data collected by the National Vital Statistics System showed 591 unintentional firearm 
deaths in 2011. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2011, NAT’L VITAL STAT. 
REP., July 27, 2015, at 41 tbl.10, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr63/nvsr63_03.pdf 
(listing number of deaths by age from 113 selected causes). But see Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, 
Children and Guns: The Hidden Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/children-and-guns-the-hidden-toll.html (reviewing 
hundreds of child firearm deaths and concluding that “accidental shootings occurred roughly 
twice as often as the records indicate, because of idiosyncrasies in how such deaths are classified 
by the authorities”). 
The gun debate tends to focus on deaths, but most shooting victims do not die. In 2012, 17,362 
persons were injured in nonfatal, unintentional shootings. See Web-Based Injury Statistics Query 
and Reporting System (WISQARS), Nonfatal Injury Reports 2001–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html (select 
“Unintentional” for intent of injury option, “Firearm” for cause of injury option, and “2012 to 
2012” for “Year(s) of Report”; then follow “Submit Request” hyperlink). 
In terms of context, 2010 data for sixteen states showed that 32.1% of accidental shooting 
deaths occurred while the victim was “playing with” the firearm. Sharyn E. Parks et al., 
Surveillance for Violent Deaths—National Violent Death Reporting System, 16 States, 2010, 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES, Jan. 17, 2014, at 1, 33 tbl.23, 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6301a1.htm. Hunting or showing a gun to 
others each comprised 13.6% of accidental deaths. Id. Regarding the known circumstances of 
injury, 38.3% died as a result of unintentionally pulling the trigger and 13.6% died because they 
thought the gun was unloaded or could not fire because the magazine was disengaged. Id. Nearly 
45% (44.4%) of the accidental shooting deaths were unsatisfactorily classified simply as “[o]ther 
mechanism of injury.” Id. 
5
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suicide.17 Most deaths in both categories result from accessing unsecured 
guns in the home.18 While access to guns by minors residing in gun-
owning households is not directly addressed in this Article, much of the 
discussion applies to them. Although courts have shown a greater 
willingness to impose legal responsibility on gun owners in home access 
cases than in traditional theft cases, several decisions have protected the 
right to be negligent in the former situation.19  
The concentration in this Article on gun thefts is a microcosm of a 
much larger issue. The right to be negligent permeates every level of the 
U.S. gun market and culture, from manufacture to end use. Manufacturers 
benefit from it enormously, principally in the form of the PLCAA. 
Subject to some narrow exceptions, the PLCAA bars all actions against 
gun manufacturers for harm caused by the criminal misuse of a firearm,20 
including negligent marketing and distribution claims for failing to act 
reasonably to monitor, train, or terminate corrupt or negligent dealers, 
even though they are known to be the principal conduits of guns used in 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Suicide is the third leading cause of death for fifteen to twenty-four year olds. CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, SUICIDE: 
FACTS AT A GLANCE 2 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-
a.pdf. In 2010, suicides comprised six of every ten firearm deaths. See Drew DeSilver, Suicides 
Account for Most Gun Deaths, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 24, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/24/suicides-account-for-most-gun-deaths/. In the 
same year, 375 persons ages seventeen and younger and 1752 persons ages eighteen to twenty-
four committed suicide with a gun. D’Vera Cohn et al., Gun Homicide Rate Down 49% Since 
1993 Peak; Public Unaware, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 42 (May 7, 2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/05/firearms_final_05-2013.pdf (tabulating CDC’s 
WISQARS results in a table titled “Firearm Suicide Deaths, by Age, 1981–2010”). 
 18. See GEO STONE, SUICIDE AND ATTEMPTED SUICIDE: METHODS AND CONSEQUENCES 12 
(1999) (stating that 90% of all suicide attempts by adolescents occur in the home); Parks et al., 
supra note 16, at 11 (finding that 67% of the accidental firearms deaths included in the study 
occurred in a house or apartment). 
 19. See, e.g., Smith v. Brooks, 545 S.E.2d 135, 135–36 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming 
summary judgment for the defendant parents of minor child who accidentally shot his friend 
because the plaintiffs failed to show the child had a known proclivity for misusing firearms in the 
home); France v. Lambert, No. CA-8197, 1990 WL 187081, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1990) 
(affirming summary judgment for the parents of minor who accidentally shot his friend with his 
parents’ gun because it was not foreseeable that the son would violate house rules by having a 
friend over when his parents were not home); Hughes v. Brown, 36 Va. Cir. 444, 449–50 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. 1995) (upholding summary judgment for the defendant father whose son shot and injured 
a friend with his father’s gun because there was no previous indication that the father’s 
instructions regarding firearm safety and handling had been disobeyed). 
 20. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2012) (defining a “qualified civil liability action,” which 
is banned by the Act, as “a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by 
any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for 
damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or 
penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by 
the person or a third party” (emphasis added)). 
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crimes, or “crime guns.”21 The PLCAA also precludes products liability 
design defect claims arising from volitional acts that are classified as 
unlawful, even in cases of accidental shootings that could have been 
prevented by a feasible alternative design.22 Because no federal gun 
                                                                                                                     
 21. No laws or regulations require gun makers to track their products or monitor their retail 
dealers, even though it is well-known that overtly corrupt or “look the other way” dealers funnel 
large numbers of guns into the hands of illegal, unauthorized users. A 2000 report by the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms analyzing 1530 firearms trafficking investigations from 1996 
through 1998, determined that corrupt firearms licensees were associated with more than 40,000 
guns diverted into the illegal market, nearly half of the total number of trafficked firearms 
involved in the investigations. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS TRAFFICKERS ix–x (2000). 
A 1995 report found that nearly 50% of traced crime guns in a particular year came from less than 
1% of the nation’s firearms licensees. See GLENN L. PIERCE ET AL., NE. UNIV., THE IDENTIFICATION 
OF PATTERNS IN FIREARMS TRAFFICKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOCUSED ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
11 & tbl.5 (1995) (showing that 49.4% of 121,110 crime guns in the study were traced back to 
federal firearms licensees comprising less than 1% of the total number of licensed gun sellers). 
Gun advocates respond that the latter figure is partly explained by the fact that a majority of 
firearms are sold by large retailers, which comprise only a small percentage of total licensees. See 
generally Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun Trafficking and the 
Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1233 (2009) (analyzing data 
regarding how criminals obtain guns and attacking the “myth” that large numbers of crime guns 
originate in large-scale gun-trafficking operations by licensed firearms dealers).  
Prior to the PLCAA, negligent distribution claims took two basic forms: (1) oversupplying 
markets with weak gun laws with far more guns than could be consumed by residents in the area, 
knowing that large numbers of the guns were being diverted to the illegal market; and (2) failing 
to monitor and train retailers to detect and terminate those who were either intentionally or 
negligently participating in straw purchases or other transactions that diverted guns to criminals. 
See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 8–11 (2006) (summarizing negligent 
marketing and distribution claims).  
 22. In Adames v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. 2009), a minor accidentally shot and killed 
his friend while playing with his father’s semiautomatic handgun, believing the gun to be 
unloaded because the magazine was removed, id. at 745, a common type of gun accident. The 
court held that the PLCAA barred a design defect claim against Beretta, manufacturer of the gun, 
for failing to incorporate a device known as a magazine disconnect safety that prevents 
semiautomatic pistols from firing when the magazine is removed. Id. at 750, 765. Beretta 
conceded that the accident would not have occurred had a magazine disconnect been incorporated 
and that the device would add $10, at most, to the cost of a $500 handgun. Id. at 749. The PLCAA 
bars products liability suits “where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that 
constituted a criminal offense.” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). While conceding that the boy 
“accidentally shot and killed his friend,” Adames, 909 N.E.2d at 745, the court held that the claim 
fell under the ban because the shooter volitionally pulled the trigger and was subsequently 
adjudged delinquent in juvenile court for reckless discharge of a firearm. Id. at 763. Many gun 
accidents involve reckless conduct by minors or young adults. See GARY KLECK, TARGETING 
GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 321 (1997) (concluding that fatal gun accidents commonly 
involve adolescents and young adults and usually involve reckless behavior). One study found 
that 20.3% of adults surveyed did not think a semiautomatic handgun could be fired with the 
magazine removed, while another 14.5% said they did not know. Jon S. Vernick et al., “I Didn’t 
Know the Gun Was Loaded”: An Examination of Two Safety Devices that Can Reduce the Risk 
7
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safety design regulations exist,23 the absence of a threat of tort liability 
leaves gun manufacturers with little incentive to implement safer gun 
designs, such as personalized gun technology that would prevent 
unauthorized users from operating a firearm.24 A separate article 
dedicated to manufacturers and the right to be negligent could be written.  
That the right to be negligent is derived from deference to Second 
Amendment rights is directly shown by the PLCAA. The PLCAA begins 
with a statement of “Findings,” the first of which states: “The Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”25 No other 
consumer product receives federal immunity from tort liability.26  
                                                                                                                     
of Unintentional Firearm Injuries, 20 J. PUB. HEALTH & POL’Y 427, 430 (1999). Among 
respondents who believed either that the pistol could not be discharged or did not know if it could 
be discharged, 28% lived in a gun-owning household. Id.  
 23. Federal law imposes no safety requirements for domestic handgun designs. See Jon S. 
Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as Consumer 
Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1196–97 (2000) (discussing the fact that no federal agency 
has the authority to impose firearm design standards). The Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC), the agency charged with regulating the safety of most consumer products, is prohibited 
by federal law from imposing any safety regulation on firearms or ammunition. Consumer Product 
Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 3(e), 90 Stat. 503 (1976) 
(“The Consumer Product Safety Commission shall make no ruling or order that restricts the 
manufacture or sale of firearms, firearms ammunition, or components of firearms ammunition, 
including black powder or gunpowder for firearms.”). As it is often said, the CPSC can regulate 
toy guns but not real ones. E.g., Protect Children, Not Guns: The Truth About Guns, CHILDREN’S 
DEFENSE FUND (July 2013), http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/data/state-data-
repository/the-truth-about-guns.pdf.  
 24. “Smart gun” technology has been feasible for many years as suggested by the now-
forgotten, defunct settlement agreement by Smith & Wesson reached in the government plaintiff 
litigation in 2000, in which Smith & Wesson agreed to do the following: (1) within two years, to 
equip each handgun with an internal lock that could be operated only by a key, combination, or 
other mechanism unique to the gun; (2) to commit 2% of annual revenues to developing 
personalized technology; and (3) within three years, to use its best efforts to incorporate 
personalized technology in every new handgun design. ANDREW J. MCCLURG ET AL., GUN 
CONTROL & GUN RIGHTS 348–49 (2002). Colt’s Manufacturing Co. (Colt) once saw smart guns 
as a potential major growth area in the market. Stephen T. Teret & Adam D. Mernit, Personalized 
Guns: Using Technology to Save Lives, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: INFORMING 
POLICY WITH EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 173, 177 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013). 
A 1999 internal memo noted that “remarkable progress was being made” in smart gun technology. 
Id. The memo came to light during discovery in a lawsuit against Colt. Id. Shortly thereafter, Colt 
and other gun makers discontinued work on personalized guns. Id. 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(1); see also Ileto v. Glock, 565 F.3d 1126, 1140 n.10 (9th Cir. 
2009) (upholding the constitutionality of the PLCAA by taking “note that Congress . . . included 
findings and statements of purpose related to its interest in protecting individuals’ Second 
Amendment right to bear arms”). 
 26. The only industry other than the gun industry to receive broad statutory immunity from 
civil lawsuits is the childhood vaccine industry. In 1986, Congress passed the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act, setting up a compensation program to promote the development of disease 
8
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The tie to the Second Amendment from legislative inaction and the 
state of the common law is less direct, but in stolen gun cases, the nexus 
is reasonably inferable because of the absence of other plausible 
explanations for giving a free pass to gun possessors to exercise 
unreasonable care in safeguarding the most dangerous product.27 While 
it is true that courts have always been reluctant to impose tort liability on 
an original negligent actor for a subsequent criminal act, as discussed in 
Part II, they have done so in numerous contexts where the risk of a 
criminal act is what made the original act negligent in the first place.28 
One explanation for the paucity of direct references to the Second 
Amendment in firearms cases is that until the Supreme Court decided 
McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010,29 courts correctly assumed that the 
Second Amendment had no application to state tort law.30 By that point, 
the PLCAA, prohibiting most suits, was already well-entrenched. 
One might argue that the immunity from responsibility for harm 
caused with stolen guns is a necessary byproduct of protecting a 
constitutional right, similar to the First Amendment protection of 
negligent conduct in defamation actions by public officials and figures, 
                                                                                                                     
vaccines after a wave of lawsuits drove some small vaccine companies out of business, causing 
vaccine shortages. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 
3755 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). But unlike the PLCAA, the 
Vaccine Act set up a separate no-fault compensation fund for persons injured by vaccines funded 
by an excise tax on vaccine sales. See Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 352 (2011). Compensation claims are 
heard by a special court. Id. at 354–55 (discussing the compensation system under the Vaccine 
Act). If a claimant is dissatisfied with the court’s award or if the court dismisses the claim, the 
claimant is permitted to pursue a regular tort action. Id. at 355.  
 27. It is reasonable to characterize firearms in these terms because guns, at least handguns, 
are the only legal product for which the intended purpose and primary utility is to kill or injure 
human beings. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 453 (1999). Thus, 
comparisons to other dangerous products, such as automobiles, alcohol, or baseball bats, are inapt 
because their primary purposes and utilities are, respectively, transportation, recreation, and the 
national pastime. See id. Professor Robert Rabin offered the distinction that one “uses” a handgun 
to cause harm, whereas one “abuses” products such as alcohol in causing harm. Id. 
 28. See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. 
 29. 561 U.S. 742, 790 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and making it binding on the states). 
 30. See, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (noting in a public nuisance action against several gun manufacturers that the Second 
Amendment has no application to the states and citing early Supreme Court precedent to that 
effect); NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating in a lawsuit 
asserting numerous claims against several gun manufacturers that “[t]his is a case invoking state 
tort law; the Second Amendment limits only the powers of the federal government”); Hamilton 
v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1317–18 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining in a negligent marketing 
action against several gun manufacturers that “the Supreme Court has held that the Second 
Amendment limits only the power of Congress” and does not inhibit state tort law). 
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but a crucial distinction exists. Most restrictions on speech run afoul of 
the First Amendment, but nothing in the history nor jurisprudence of the 
Second Amendment suggests, much less guarantees, a privilege by gun 
sellers and owners to act unreasonably in securing firearms from theft.  
Part I of this Article explores the scope of the risk of stolen guns and 
the burden of safely securing firearms from theft. Part II analyzes how 
the law, through both inaction and affirmative legislative and common 
law actions, has given its imprimatur to negligently safeguarding from 
access by thieves. Part III asserts that the trickle-down effect of this 
imprimatur is under-deterrence of unreasonable, dangerous conduct and 
a mindset among many gun owners that rejects suggestions of legal 
responsibility to exercise reasonable care in securing firearms.  
I.  STOLEN GUNS: RISKS AND BURDENS 
Unauthorized access to firearms assumes two basic forms: traditional 
theft and access by persons, usually minors, living in the gun owner’s 
home. The distinction between the two categories blurs in situations 
where an older minor or young adult who lives in or has access to a 
relative’s home removes a gun from the premises and uses it for an 
intentional criminal act.31 This Article focuses on traditional thefts,32 but 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See, e.g., Jones v. Secord, 684 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2012) (granting summary judgment 
to the gun owner in action alleging negligence in failing to properly secure gun and timely report 
its theft by his grandson who used it to kill three people); Bridges v. Parrish, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796 
(N.C. 2013) (declining to hold parents of adult son liable for negligently storing handgun when 
son retrieved the gun from their home and used it to shoot his girlfriend); Estate of Heck ex rel. 
Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 266 (Ind. 2003) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of action 
against parents of an adult fugitive felon who retrieved defendants’ gun from their home and used 
it to fatally shoot a police officer).  
 32. Related to negligent firearms security is the theory of negligent entrustment, which is 
not part of this Article. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the doctrine of negligent 
entrustment as follows: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of 
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of 
his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier 
should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for 
physical harm resulting to them. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  
An essential element of a negligent entrustment claim is affirmatively supplying the chattel 
to the unfit user. See id. Thus, the claim does not encompass thefts. Some courts, however, have 
recognized that constructive entrustment can occur in situations where the defendant permitted 
access to the chattel to a dangerous user under circumstances where the defendant knew or should 
have known the person would find and misuse the chattel. See, e.g., Foster v. Arthur, 519 So. 2d 
1092, 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In Foster, the defendant’s roommate took her gun, which 
10
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much of the reasoning applies equally to access by minors in the 
household. Importantly, the same measures necessary to prevent 
unauthorized access to guns by thieves would also preclude unauthorized 
access to guns by minors, preventing many gun accidents and suicides.33 
Gun thefts occur primarily through residential and vehicle burglaries, 
but also in large numbers from retail gun sellers.34 As is true of so much 
data in the gun debate,35 pinning down the number of stolen guns is an 
elusive quest. Survey research by Professors Philip Cook and Jens 
Ludwig estimated that roughly 600,000 guns are stolen in noncommercial 
thefts annually36 (an average of approximately 1600 guns a day). The 
U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated, based 
on its annual National Crime Victimization Survey, that 232,400 firearms 
were stolen each year from 2005 through 2010 in household burglaries or 
other property crimes37 (an average of approximately 635 a day).  
                                                                                                                     
she kept under her mattress for self-protection, and used it to shoot the plaintiff. Id. at 1093. She 
never gave the roommate permission to use the gun, and, in fact, denied that she had disclosed its 
whereabouts to him. See id. In upholding a claim against the defendant grounded in negligent 
entrustment, the court said: “Consent to use a firearm need not be expressly given . . . . It may be 
given indirectly through the conduct of the gun owner, such as when, under certain circumstances, 
he provides the opportunity for another person to use the gun.” Id. at 1094. The court found 
sufficient evidence in the defendant’s knowledge of her roommate’s violent past and the fact that 
he knew she owned a gun to put her on notice that he might appropriate the gun with harmful 
results. Id. at 1095. Because there was no evidence that the defendant actually entrusted the 
firearm to the roommate, even by passive acquiescence, Foster would have been better analyzed 
as a case of negligent storage, rather than negligent entrustment. See Herland v. Izatt, 345 P.3d 
661, 663, 674 (Utah 2015) (holding in a negligent entrustment case where plaintiff’s decedent 
shot herself with defendant’s handgun while intoxicated at a party in his home that a duty would 
exist if the defendant committed either “(1) directly supplying or handing a gun to another, (2) 
placing the gun within reach of another, or (3) consenting (either explicitly or implicitly) to the 
use of the gun by another”). 
 33. See supra notes 16–17. 
 34. See Kleck & Wang, supra note 21, at 1293. Much less frequently, guns are stolen in 
transit from commercial shippers. Reporting of In-Transit Loss and Theft of Firearms, NAT’L 
SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (2015), http://www.nssf.org/factsheets/PDF/ReportingOfIntransit.pdf. 
Guns stolen in transit are not specifically addressed in this Article, but the same arguments would 
apply in the event negligence contributed to such a theft. 
 35. Current, reliable firearms data and research are woefully lacking in most areas due in 
large part to actions by Congress. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Firearms Policy and the Black 
Community: Rejecting the “Wouldn’t You Want a Gun If Attacked?” Argument, 45 CONN. L. REV. 
1773, 1798–1800 (2013) (tracing how Congress terminated government funding of firearms 
research back in the 1990s). 
 36. See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS IN AMERICA: 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 7 (1997), https://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf.  
 37. LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS STOLEN DURING HOUSEHOLD 
BURGLARIES AND OTHER PROPERTY CRIMES, 2005–2010, at 1 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/fshbopc0510.pdf.  
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Pursuant to an executive action issued by President Barack Obama in 
the wake of the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting in 
Newtown, Connecticut,38 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) compiled a report on stolen and lost guns for 2012, 
finding that 173,675 guns were reported to the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) as stolen or lost from individuals.39 The 
report noted that “the statistics in this report likely reveal only a fraction 
of the problem,” due mostly to the lack of any mandate that individuals 
report stolen guns to law enforcement or that law enforcement agencies 
report stolen guns to the NCIC.40 Mandatory reporting of stolen guns 
would hold gun owners more accountable for securing them, enable 
better data collection, solve more crimes, and prevent some crimes from 
occurring; yet only ten states and the District of Columbia have laws 
requiring an individual to report a stolen firearm.41  
In addition to gun thefts from individuals, thousands of guns are stolen 
each year from federal firearms licensees (FFLs). Federal regulations 
require FFLs to report stolen or lost guns to ATF within forty-eight hours 
of the observed theft or loss.42 In 2012, FFLs reported 16,667 stolen or 
lost firearms.43 Handguns were by far the most common type of firearm 
reported stolen or lost.44 The 2012 report included 377 burglaries 
involving the theft of 4340 guns and 662 shoplifting incidents involving 
the theft of 1304 firearms.45 The actual figures are likely much higher 
because stolen or missing guns often are not discovered unless and until 
ATF inspects the records of an FFL.46 Historically, ATF has inspected 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Now Is the Time: The President’s Plan to Protect Our Children and Our Communities 
by Reducing Gun Violence, WHITE HOUSE 2, 7 (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_full.pdf. 
 39. See 2012 ATF STOLEN GUNS REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.  
 40. Id. at 2. 
 41. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-202g (2015); D.C. CODE § 7-2502.08 (2015); DEL. CODE. 
ANN. tit. 11, § 1461 (2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-4.1 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY 
§ 5-146 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 129C (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 28.430 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-19 (West 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.10 
(McKinney 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.20(A)(5) (West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
47-48.1 (West 2015). Many individuals choose not to report stolen guns. Explanations include: 
The stolen gun may have been illegal to begin with; the victim might have been carrying the gun 
illegally (for example, in a car while lacking a permit); she may be uncertain whether she was 
violating any laws in storing or carrying the gun; she may worry about liability or other legal 
ramifications; or she might be embarrassed or concerned about being stigmatized.   
 42. 27 C.F.R. § 478.39a (2014). 
 43. 2012 ATF STOLEN GUNS REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.  
 44. Id. at 10 tbl.4.  
 45. Id. at 10 tbl.3.  
 46. Id. at 3; see also Fred Schulte, ATF’s Struggle to Close Down Firearms Dealers; 
Modest Resources, Restrictive Rules Allow Troubled Outlets to Stay Open for Years, CTR. PUB. 
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only a small percentage of FFLs on an annual basis due to inadequate 
funding by Congress and other hindrances.47 A report by the Justice 
Department’s Office of the Inspector General found that between 2007 
and 2012, more than 58% of FFLs had not been inspected for five or more 
years.48 Even with increased inspection efforts under the Obama 
Administration, in 2012, ATF inspected fewer than one in five FFLs.49  
By definition, all stolen guns go directly to criminals. Not 
surprisingly, stolen guns are a primary source of guns used in crime. In 
interviews with incarcerated felons, 32% of the participants said they 
acquired their most recent firearm through theft.50 The felons who 
reported stealing guns had stolen, on average, about thirty-nine guns 
each.51 Analyzing data pertaining to how criminals obtain guns, 
criminologist Professor Gary Kleck and Dr. Shun-Yung Kevin Wang 
concluded that “[t]heft is central to criminal gun acquisition” and that 
“[m]ost gun theft is a by-product of residential burglary and other thefts 
from private owners.”52 More data is needed, but Congress—a powerful 
protector of the right to be negligent—began attaching the Tiahrt 
Amendment to appropriations bills in 2003, which bars ATF from 
releasing crime gun tracing data to the public and bans its admissibility 
in state and federal judicial proceedings.53 
Guns are profitable, desirable items for thieves. Stolen guns are 
untraceable, making them valuable to those who intend to use them in 
                                                                                                                     
INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/02/01/12117/atfs-
struggle-close-down-firearms-dealers (detailing an inspection of a Pennsylvania gun store in 2010 
in which the owner of a gun shop could not account for 3000 firearms that he had bought or sold 
in recent years). 
 47. See Schulte, supra note 46 (explaining how congressionally imposed limitations on 
inspections and funding hinder ATF’s ability to inspect and shut down law-breaking firearms 
licensees). 
 48. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF ATF’S FEDERAL 
FIREARMS LICENSEE INSPECTION PROGRAM ii (2013). 
 49.  See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, Fact Sheet—FFL 
Compliance Inspections (Feb. 2013), https://www.atf.gov/file/4796/download (stating that ATF 
conducted 13,100 compliance inspections of 69,000 FFLs in 2012). 
 50. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY 
OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 183 tbl.9.1 (expanded ed. 1994) (containing a well-known study 
based on interviews with 2000 prisoners).  
 51. Id. at 198 (estimating the average number of guns stolen by felons based on survey 
responses). 
 52. Kleck & Wang, supra note 21, at 1293.  
 53. See Colin Miller, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Why the Tiahrt Amendment’s Ban on the 
Admissibility of ATF Trace Data in State Court Actions Violates the Commerce Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 665, 667–68, 676–82 (2010) (explaining how, in 2003, 
Congress began attaching the Tiahrt Amendment to appropriations acts and arguing that the ban 
on admitting gun-tracing data as evidence in state courts violates the Commerce Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment). 
13
McClurg: The Second Amendment Right to be Negligent
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
14 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
crime.54 They are also attractive to people who are legally prohibited from 
purchasing guns from licensed dealers.55 Consequently, they are prime 
candidates to enter the secondary illegal gun market. As one judge said 
bluntly: “The notion that it is not foreseeable that a stolen handgun will 
be used in violent crime is simply nonsense.”56  
The burden on individuals of securing firearms from thieves has three 
components, while the burden on commercial sellers has two. The two 
burdens individuals and retailers share are the effort and financial 
investment required to safely secure firearms from theft. For individuals, 
the third burden is the concern that a secured firearm will be unavailable 
for self-defense when needed. This has long been a rallying cry by gun 
rights activists against safe gun storage requirements despite the absence 
of a single credible report of a person being injured because of an inability 
to access a properly secured gun.57 Even the National Rifle Association 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 956 (Md. 1999) (Raker, J., concurring) 
(“Stolen guns are particularly attractive to people who intend to commit violent crimes with 
handguns because they are untraceable, an important characteristic to felons, and enjoy a 
potentially quick turnover.”). 
 55. See id. (noting that “under federal and state law, felons are unable to buy handguns 
legitimately from a licensed retail merchant”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (listing 
categories of prohibited gun purchasers, which include any person “who has been convicted in 
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”). 
 56. Valentine, 727 A.2d at 956. 
 57. In 2000, gun rights proponent John Lott wrote an op-ed piece arguing that requiring 
safe gun storage “would likely greatly increase deaths resulting from crime.” See John R. Lott, 
Jr., Childproof Gun Locks: Bound to Misfire, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 1997, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB86899922428162000. I noted in response that not a single 
reported case could be located in which a gun owner suffered harm because of an inability to 
access a securely stored gun. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous, supra note 7, at 1213. Shortly 
thereafter, gun rights activists began citing to a 2000 incident involving a pitchfork-wielding man 
who attacked and murdered two children when their parents were not home. See Man in Pitchfork 
Slaying Identified, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/aug/25/news/mn-
10333. Some gun proponents have argued that a fourteen-year-old sibling in the house at the time 
could have prevented the attack if her parents’ gun had not been locked up, see, e.g., Erich Pratt, 
When Gun Safety Locks Kill, GUN OWNERS AM. (Sept. 29, 2008), 
http://gunowners.org/sk0404.htm, placing them in the remarkable position of advocating leaving 
unsecured firearms accessible to unsupervised children.  
Other than the pitchfork case, research located only two reported incidents in which an 
inability to fire or access a gun supposedly contributed to preventing a person from using a gun 
in self-defense. One situation involved a home invasion allegedly set up by a relative in which a 
woman attempted to fire her husband’s gun at an intruder who had killed her husband. Jamie 
Satterfield, Vickie Graves Says She Tried to Shoot Intruder, Gun Wouldn’t Go Off, KNOXVILLE 
NEWS SENTINEL (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/local-news/vickie-
graves-shoot-intruder-testify-bill. The woman said the gun would not fire due to unspecified 
safety mechanisms in the gun. Id. The other incident involved a Texas prosecutor killed during a 
home invasion. Selwyn Crawford, Slain Kaufman DA’s Children Say His Guns Were out of Reach 
the Night He Died, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013, 11:04 PM), 
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(NRA) advises: “Store guns so they are not accessible to unauthorized 
persons.”58 Guns and Ammo, the venerable gun magazine, states that 
“[m]odern firearms are powerful tools that experienced shooters 
understand need to be treated with respect” and that “it’s very important 
to store them properly.”59 Organizations as diverse as ammunition 
manufacturers and pediatrics groups recommend storing guns both 
unloaded and locked.60  
Superficially, it could be argued that the Supreme Court’s 2008 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller61 precludes government-
enforced safe gun storage. Heller held that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to possess a firearm in the home for self-
defense and struck down the District of Columbia’s handgun ban.62 The 
Court also invalidated a restriction that any firearm in a home be kept at 
all times “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20130408-children-say-mclelland-put-
his-guns-away-before-he-died.ece. According to his son, the victim “kept a gun ‘in every room 
of his house’” but had “gathered up all his guns and put them away in a bag” for a party the night 
before “so that his guests didn’t stumble across them.” Id. 
Assuming, against reason and the facts, that all three of the above cases were meritorious 
examples of the pitfalls of safe gun storage, they occurred over a period of years in which millions 
of unsecured guns were stolen in household burglaries and many thousands of minors died in 
accidental shootings and adolescent suicides using their parents’ guns. See supra notes 16–17, 
36–37 and accompanying text. During the same period, tens of millions of household burglaries 
occurred in which no one reported an injury because of an inability to access a securely stored 
gun. See SHANNON CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: 
VICTIMIZATION DURING HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 1 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vd 
hb.pdf (estimating that 3.7 million household burglaries occur each year). 
 58. NRA Gun Safety Rules, NRA PROGRAMS & SERVS., http://training.nra.org/nra-gun-
safety-rules.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The full passage states:  
Store guns so they are not accessible to unauthorized persons. Many factors must 
be considered when deciding where and how to store guns. A person’s particular 
situation will be a major part of the consideration. Dozens of gun storage devices, 
as well as locking devices that attach directly to the gun, are available. However, 
mechanical locking devices, like the mechanical safeties built into guns, can fail 
and should not be used as a substitute for safe gun handling and the observance 
of all gun safety rules. 
Id. 
 59. B. Gil Horman, G&A Basics: How to Store Your Gun, GUNS & AMMO (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.gunsandammo.com/home-featured/ga-basics-how-to-store-your-gun/ (emphasis 
omitted). 
 60. See Mark D. Polston & Douglas S. Weil, Unsafe by Design: Using Tort Actions to 
Reduce Firearm-Related Injuries, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 14 (1997) (citing 
recommendations by Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute and American 
Academy of Pediatrics that guns be stored unloaded and locked). 
 61. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 62. Id. at 635.  
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similar device”63 on the basis that the prohibition rendered the right to 
self-defense meaningless.64 But as subsequent cases have held, laws that 
preserve a right to immediate self-defense by requiring safe storage 
whenever the gun is not under the control of the owner do not run afoul 
of Heller.65 
It is not the goal of this Article, nor would it be possible, to articulate 
what reasonable care requires under all circumstances with regard to 
firearm security. As the circumstances change, the amount of required 
care changes.66 As a general observation, apart from keeping the gun 
under one’s immediate control, a sturdy, non-portable gun safe is the 
most secure option for preventing unauthorized access.67 Today, there are 
nearly as many types and styles of gun safes as there are types of guns.68 
Many safes provide quick-pad combination or biometric locks, activated 
by hand or fingerprint recognition, allowing quick access.69 Many small 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 630. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, No. C 09-2143 RS, 2012 WL 3580525, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) (upholding a San Francisco ordinance requiring handguns that are “not 
under direct, personal control” within the home to have trigger locks or be stored in locked containers); 
Commonwealth v. Reyes, 982 N.E.2d 504, 506 (Mass. 2013) (upholding the same statute, concluding 
that “the statute is neither impermissibly vague nor violative of [the defendant’s] right to self-defense”); 
Commonwealth v. McGowan, 982 N.E.2d 495, 496 (Mass. 2013) (upholding a Massachusetts statute 
requiring firearms not under the owner’s control to be stored in a locked container or equipped with a 
safety device that renders the firearm operable only by the authorized user). 
 66. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Horman, supra note 59 (“Simply stated, gun safes are the most secure gun storage option 
available to the average gun owner.”).  
 68. Review websites such as GunSafeReviewsGuy.com and GunSafeAdvisor.com offer useful 
information about the many different types of gun safes available. Honest Gun Safe Reviews, GUN SAFE 
REVIEWS GUY, http://gunsafereviewsguy.com/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016); The Ultimate Gun Safe Buying 
Guide, GUN SAFE ADVISOR, http://www.gunsafeadvisor.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). There 
appears to be a general consensus among safe reviewers regarding some of the top brands, although not 
necessarily the particular model. See, e.g., Best Gun Safe, GUN SAFE REVIEWS GUY, 
http://gunsafereviewsguy.com/buyers-guide/best-gun-safe/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2015) 
(recommending the AMSEC BF gun safe); Total Security in a Small Space—Best Gun Safes for 
Apartments, GUN SAFE ADVISOR, http://www.gunsafeadvisor.com/total-security-in-a-small-space-
best-gun-safes-for-apartments/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2015) (recommending the AMSEC DV652 
Defense Vault). Across review sites, reviewers warn customers to not let cost deter them from investing 
in a high-quality gun safe. See Marc Weber Tobias, Unsafe Gun Safes Can Be Opened by a Three-
Year Old, FORBES (July 27, 2012, 11:32 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcwebertobias/2012/07/27/unsafe-gun-safes-can-be-opened-by-a-
three-year-old/ (describing dangers of unsecure gun safes and the ways in which they can be easily 
circumvented). 
 69. See generally What to Look For in a Gun Safe, GUN SAFE REVIEWS GUY, 
http://gunsafereviewsguy.com/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2015) (discussing different features of gun safes); 
The Ultimate Gun Safe Buying Guide, supra note 68.  
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safes are designed to be permanently mounted or secured with a cable.70 
No safe is foolproof, but reasonable care does not require foolproof 
measures. Alternatively, a gun owner concerned about not being able to 
obtain quick access to a handgun can keep the gun under his immediate 
control.71  
For commercial sellers, the burden of securing guns is lower in one 
regard and higher in another. It is lower because the immediate self-defense 
burden is absent. It is higher because, with so many guns in one place, the 
magnitude of the risk demands more extensive security measures. In terms 
of specifics, as detailed in Part II, ATF makes detailed recommendations to 
firearms licensees regarding proper gun security,72 while nine states and the 
District of Columbia impose specific security measures on gun sellers by 
statute.73 
II.  THE LAW’S IMPRIMATUR OF THE RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT 
Having explored the risks of stolen guns and the burdens of reducing the 
risks, this Part explores the Article’s thesis that the law, through both inaction 
and affirmative action, has created a de facto right to be negligent in failing 
to secure access to firearms by unauthorized users. 
A.  Imprimatur Through Inaction 
A principal means by which the law has given its imprimatur to 
unreasonable conduct with regard to gun security is through the failure to 
affirmatively demand reasonable conduct via statutes or regulations. 
Guns in Homes. No federal or state law mandates that guns in homes or 
vehicles be securely stored to prevent theft.74 In 2005, Congress passed the 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See Gun Safe Buyer’s Guide, GUN SAFE REVIEWS GUY, http://gunsafereviewsguy.com/
buyers-guide/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2015). 
 71. See MASSAD AYOOB, GUN SAFETY IN THE HOME 66–70 (Corrina Peterson ed., 2014) 
(discussing the two options for safe firearms storage in the home as either keeping the gun in a safe or 
under the immediate control of the owner). 
 72. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 73. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.  
 74. Among states, only Massachusetts has a mandatory safe storage law of broad applicability 
and even that law would not necessarily protect guns from theft. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, 
§ 131L(a) (West 2015) (“It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm . . . in any place unless such 
weapon is secured in a locked container or equipped with a tamper-resistant mechanical lock or other 
safety device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inoperable by any person other than the 
owner or other lawfully authorized user.”). Three states—California, Connecticut, and New York—
mandate safe gun storage in specific circumstances. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25135 (West 2015) 
(mandating safe gun storage if firearm owner knows or has reason to know that a co-dweller is 
prohibited by state or federal law from possessing a firearm); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-37i (West 
2015) (requiring safe storage of loaded guns if another resident is ineligible to possess a firearm under 
state or federal law or “poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other 
individuals”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.45 (McKinney 2015) (mandating safe gun storage if a firearm 
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Child Safety Lock Act of 2005, which requires all gun makers and sellers to 
furnish a “secure gun storage or safety device”75 with the sale of any 
handgun.76 Gun makers and sellers comply with the law by supplying an 
inexpensive childproofing trigger lock or cable lock, often accompanied by 
a hard plastic case with predrilled holes for a padlock, all of which can be 
easily defeated.77 Use of the supplied device is not mandated by the law, but 
if it is used, the Act confers tort immunity on the gun owner for harm 
resulting from theft by a criminal misuser,78 despite the fact that the safety 
devices are childproofing measures, not theft deterrent devices.79  
At least twenty-five states have some form of a Child Access Prevention 
law,80 commonly called a CAP law.81 These laws do not mandate safe 
                                                                                                                     
owner lives with one who has been convicted of a felony, adjudicated as a mental defective or 
committed to a mental institution, or convicted of domestic violence).  
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(34) (2012). See infra note 155 for full statutory definition. 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(1) (making it unlawful for any importer, manufacturer, or dealer to sell 
or transfer a handgun without a secure gun storage or safety device as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(34)). 
 77. See Marc Weber Tobias, The Lockdown: Gun Locks—Unsafe at Any Caliber, ENGADGET 
(June 13, 2007, 1:08 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2007/06/13/the-lockdown-gun-locks-unsafe-at-
any-caliber/ (showing photos of both types of locks and discussing how they can be easily thwarted 
even by children); see also Alex Blate, Project ChildUnsafe: Gun Safety Fail, YOUTUBE (Dec. 31, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1U0CHhDm8EY (demonstrating how to unlock a cable 
gun lock in less than ten seconds using a piece of metal from a windshield wiper insert and other simple 
tools); mmatt, Trigger Lock Removal with a Screwdriver, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P397UsoyNBc (demonstrating how to remove a trigger lock with 
a small screwdriver and asserting that an eleven-year-old boy with an imagination could figure out how 
to remove one). Trigger locks and cable locks are the two types of basic gun locks. Horman, supra note 
59. Both of them are childproofing locks, not theft deterrent locks. See id. Trigger locks, as the name 
suggests, are affixed around the trigger to prevent it from being pulled. Id. Cable locks are used 
primarily in semiautomatic handguns. The cable is looped through the barrel or the grip where the 
magazine is inserted and locked with a padlock or combination lock. Id.  
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(3) (granting tort immunity in state and federal courts for one who uses a 
“secure gun storage or safety device” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(34) in the event someone gains 
unauthorized access to the gun and criminally misuses it). 
 79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
 80. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-217a, 29-37i (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-
2507.02 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1456 (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.174 
(West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-101.1 (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-10.5, 
707-714.5 (West 2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-9 (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 724.22(7) (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.110 (West 2015); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 4-104 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131L (West 2015); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 609.666 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.060 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 202.300 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650-C:1 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-15 
(West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-315.1 (West 2015); 2014 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 193; 18 
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110.1 (West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-47-60.1 
(West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1320 (West 2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.13 (West 
2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-509.5 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56.2 (West 2015); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.55 (West 2015).  
 81. See, e.g., McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws, supra note 7, at 61–69 (exploring 
the details of state CAP laws). 
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firearm storage but rather make it a crime, usually a misdemeanor,82 for 
a gun owner to negligently store a loaded firearm in the event a child 
(protected ages vary by state) gains access to the weapon and uses it to 
cause harm to herself or another.83 CAP laws typically include a list of 
defenses, including a “safe storage” defense.84 The law is not violated if 
the gun was stored with a trigger lock or in a gun safe or other lockbox.85 
While no data exists, anecdotally, prosecutors rarely pursue charges 
under CAP laws. In cases where a gun owner’s child has been killed, 
prosecutors are perhaps understandably reluctant to add more pain and 
misery.86  
Retail Gun Dealers. Acknowledging it is well-known that thieves 
target gun stores searching for vulnerabilities,87 ATF makes extensive 
recommendations to FFLs for properly securing and handling guns.88 
These include detailed recommendations for structural security, 
inventory security, employee screening, safe business practices, customer 
safety, and disaster preparedness.89 But none of ATF’s recommendations 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See id. at 63. The statutes do not provide for civil liability. Id. at 53. But see CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 52-571g (West 2015) (imposing strict liability “when a minor or, a resident of the 
premises who is ineligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law or who poses a risk of 
imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals, obtains a firearm . . . and 
causes the injury or death of such minor, resident or any other person”).  
 83. McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws, supra note 7, at 50, 61. 
 84. Id. at 64.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 68–69. 
 87. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SAFETY AND SECURITY INFORMATION FOR FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEES 8 (2010) [hereinafter 
ATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO FFLS] (“Experience has shown that in many instances, the thieves 
spend a considerable amount of time evaluating these businesses to determine and capitalize on 
their vulnerabilities.”). 
 88. See id. at 8–15 (offering detailed recommendations for securing firearms in retail 
establishments). 
 89. The ATF guidance includes recommendations regarding the following: Structural 
Security (evaluate business location, door and window locks, windows and doorjambs, other 
unsecured openings such as window air conditioner openings, walls and ceilings, exterior lighting 
and surrounding structures, shrubs and trees, and front windows and entrance; obtain and evaluate 
an alarm system and protect alarm codes; evaluate need for a video camera system, installation of 
a remotely activated electronic security entrance, and store layout during business hours and after 
business hours, including a “best business practice” recommendation “to remove all firearms from 
display cases and racks and place them in a gun vault at night”); Inventory Security (conduct 
periodic physical inventories, accurately record physical inventory, require two-party inventories, 
protect inventory records, keep timely acquisition and disposition records, examine firearms 
shipments to determine accuracy, and keep display cases locked at all times); Employee Screening 
(institute an employee background screening, require proof of identity, and discuss questions with 
local police or ATF); Safe Business Practices (show only one firearm at a time to a customer, 
disable display firearms, do not leave a customer who is handling a firearm unattended, keep 
ammunition stored separately from firearms and out of reach of customers, do not meet with 
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have the force of law. They merely provide “guidance” and “ideas.”90  
Only nine states and the District of Columbia have laws imposing 
security requirements on gun retailers.91 As an example, California, 
which has among the nation’s strictest gun laws, requires that during non-
business hours, gun sellers must store firearms in a secure facility that is 
part of the premises, secure firearms with a locked hardened steel rod or 
cable through the trigger guard of the firearm that is shielded from the 
use of a bolt-cutter, or store firearms in a locked fireproof safe or vault 
on the licensee’s business premises.92 
A comparative indicator of how society tolerates conduct by firearms 
dealers that increases the risk of guns being stolen or otherwise diverted 
to criminal users can be found by examining Colorado’s laws regarding 
recreational marijuana. While the federal government and forty-one 
states (including Colorado) have declined to mandate security measures 
for retail gun dealers, the Colorado Constitution and regulations adopted 
pursuant thereto require security measures for recreational marijuana 
retailers.93 ATF only recommends conducting background checks on 
                                                                                                                     
customers after hours or off site, and wipe down all countertops and doors each night (because it 
is easier to capture fingerprints from a clean surface in the event of a break-in), do not leave 
counter and safe keys in the cash register at night, ship firearms in a way that requires signatures 
or recording of transfers, provide safety and security training for employees, familiarize 
employees with firearms laws, record a description of suspicious persons and their vehicles, post 
theft warning notices in conspicuous locations, request assistance of local law enforcement 
authorities, strictly control firearms at gun shows, and do not advertise that business is 
unprotected, such as by leaving a sign or voicemail message that business is closed); Customer 
Safety (insist on complete firearms safety, recommend safe storage methods, provide customers 
with ATF Publication 3312.8, Personal Firearms Record, so they can record information about 
their firearms in the event of theft or loss); and Disaster Preparedness (prepare a disaster plan to 
protect business inventory and the public from the risk of firearms theft in the event of an 
impending disaster). Id. 
 90. ATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO FFLS, supra note 87, at 8. 
 91. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-79 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26890(a)–(b) (West 2015); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-37d (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2504.07 (West 2015); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 123 (West 2015); MINN. R. 7504.0200–.0400 (2015); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 624.7161(2)–(3) (West 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 13:54-3.11, 13:54-6.1 to -6.5 (2015); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-2(a) (West 2015); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113 (West 
2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-47-40(b) (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-10(a)(1) 
(West 2015).   
 92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26890. 
 93. Part 5 of Amendment 64, which legalized recreational marijuana, addresses the 
“Regulation of marijuana” and required the Department of Revenue to develop safety regulations 
in categories, including “(IV) Security requirements for marijuana establishments” and “(V) 
Requirements to prevent the sale or diversion of marijuana and marijuana products to persons 
under the age of twenty-one.” COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 
2014 amendments); see also 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 R 305 (2015) (imposing security 
standards for retail and cultivation marijuana facilities, including continuous alarm monitoring, 
minimum lock standards, limited access areas, and perimeter fencing).  
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employees of FFLs,94 but Colorado requires them for all owners and 
employees of marijuana retailers.95 Colorado also imposes an inventory 
control model known as MITS (Marijuana Inventory Tracking System) 
in which legal marijuana must be tracked from “seed to sale” to prevent 
diversion of legal marijuana into the illegal market.96 
Guns result in more than 30,000 deaths annually.97 A 2014 study by 
German researchers claims to have documented “the first [two] cases of 
fatal cannabis smoking.”98 Other evidence shows little threat of physical 
harm from marijuana use.99 For a variety of reasons, it makes good sense 
to have security requirements for the marijuana industry designed to 
prevent theft or diversion of marijuana into the criminal market, but good 
sense, as well as rational risk–utility balancing, also demands security 
requirements in the distribution and sale of firearms to prevent access by 
illegal users. 
B.  Imprimatur Through Action 
Both the common law and statutory law have bolstered the right to be 
negligent in allowing guns to get into the hands of dangerous, 
unauthorized users. Most of the discussion below focuses on the common 
law. As referenced in the Introduction, statutory protection of the right to 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See supra note 89 (discussing ATF’s recommendation for background checks for 
employees of FFLs). 
 95. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 R 201(E)(1) (2015) (stating that license applicants “must 
be comprised of individuals . . . [w]hose criminal history background checks establish they are all 
of Good Moral Character”). 
 96. See id. at R 309 (specifying that it is “essential to regulate, monitor, and track all Retail 
Marijuana to eliminate diversion, inside and outside of the state, and to ensure that all marijuana 
grown, processed, sold and disposed of in the Retail Marijuana market is transparently accounted 
for”).  
 97. Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 
2013, at 1, 11, 83 tbl.18, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf (showing that 
in 2010, 31,672 persons died from firearm injuries, accounting for 17.5% of all U.S. injury deaths, 
and that 61.2% of the deaths were the result of suicides and 35.0% were the result of homicides). 
These figures have been relatively stable for several years. Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final 
Data for 2012, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Aug. 13, 2015, at 1, 10, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
nvsr/nvsr63/nvsr63_09.pdf.  
 98. Benno Hartung et al., Sudden Unexpected Death Under Acute Influence of Cannabis, 
237 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e11, e11 (2014). 
 99. See Daniel Fuster et al., No Detectable Association Between Frequency of Marijuana 
Use and Health or Healthcare Utilization Among Primary Care Patients Who Screen Positive for 
Drug Use, 29 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 133, 136 (2013) (concluding that there is no association 
between frequency of marijuana use and healthcare utilization and stating the study results 
“suggest that the frequency of marijuana use among patients who screen positive for drugs in 
primary care may not be associated with identifiable negative health outcomes”). To die from 
marijuana alone, one would have to ingest a dose of 1000 times the normal dose. Robert S. Gable, 
The Toxicity of Recreational Drugs, 94 AM. SCIENTIST 206, 207 (2006). 
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be negligent from the PLCAA primarily benefits gun manufacturers and 
distributors by barring most suits against them.100 Manufacturers and 
distributors are outside the scope of this Article. Thus, statutory analysis 
of the right to be negligent in this Section is limited to the tort immunity 
provision of the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005 and a provision of the 
PLCAA that has been interpreted to prohibit lawsuits against gun retailers 
for negligent security resulting in theft and subsequent criminal harm. 
A logical starting point of a common law tort analysis is the oft-
repeated judicial principle that the magnitude of the danger presented by 
firearms requires one handling or caring for them to exercise the highest 
degree of care.101 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that “those 
who deal with firearms . . . are required to exercise the closest attention 
and the most careful precautions, not only in preparing for their use but 
in using them.”102 In the context of negligent storage, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated that “firearms are so inherently dangerous . . . that 
a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of reasonable care will take 
cautious preventive measures commensurate with the great harm that 
may ensue from the use of the gun by someone unfit to be entrusted with 
it.”103 A California appellate court said that “a person dealing with a 
[handgun] is held to the highest standard of due care, even a slight 
deviation from which may constitute negligence in the safeguarding of 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
 101. As in all negligence cases, the required standard of conduct with regard to firearms is 
reasonable care under the circumstances. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS § 32, at 175 (West 5th ed. 1984). Although the standard of care is static under negligence 
law, the amount of necessary care varies with the circumstances. Using firearms as an example, 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains the distinction:  
While judicial opinions sometimes say that an actor who engages in a particularly 
dangerous activity—for example, the supplying of electricity, or the handling of 
gasoline or firearms—is subject to a “high degree of care,” this language implies 
no departure from the general approach set forth in this Section [regarding the 
normal standard of care]. Rather, it signifies that given the great magnitude of 
the risk, the balancing approach imposes on the actor an obligation of great 
precautions. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. f (AM. LAW. 
INST. 2010); see also KEETON ET AL., supra, § 34, at 208 (“The amount of care demanded by the 
standard of reasonable conduct must be in proportion to the apparent risk. As the danger becomes 
greater, the actor is required to exercise caution commensurate with it. Those who deal with 
instrumentalities that are known to be dangerous . . . must exercise a great amount of care because 
the risk is great. They may be required to take every reasonable precaution suggested by 
experience or prudence.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 103. Stoelting v. Hauck, 159 A.2d 385, 387, 389, 396 (N.J. 1960) (reviewing jury verdict 
against parents of fifteen-year-old girl for negligent storage of a pistol used by the girl to shoot 
the plaintiff and reversing the verdict on other grounds). 
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such a dangerous instrument.”104 Numerous other courts have made 
similar pronouncements.105 As discussed below, rarely in the annals of 
law has such a universally recognized principle been honored so largely 
in the breach.  
1.  Thefts from Individuals 
Courts have generally refused to hold gun owners liable for harm, 
either accidental or intentionally inflicted, caused by a third-party actor 
using a stolen gun, regardless of whether the gun was unreasonably stored 
or secured. The tools they use to accomplish this result—that is, to elevate 
the right to be negligent—are those wayward twins of different mothers, 
duty and proximate cause,106 along with their shady cousin, 
foreseeability. Both duty and proximate cause are pure policy 
determinations107 and are two ways of asking the same question: as a 
matter of fairness and public policy, should the law extend tort liability 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Reida v. Lund, 18 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704 (Ct. App. 1971) (citation omitted). 
 105. See, e.g., Bridges v. Dahl, 108 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1939) (stating that the utmost 
caution must be exercised by those in possession and control of dangerous instrumentalities such 
as firearms and explosives); Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Kan. 1998) (characterizing a 
handgun as a dangerous instrumentality requiring the highest degree of care in safeguarding); 
Estate of Strever v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666, 671 (Mont. 1996) (stating that a firearm is a dangerous 
instrumentality requiring a higher degree of care in use and handling); Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral 
Co., 18 S.E.2d 412, 417 (N.C. 1942) (stating that those having possession and control of 
dangerous instrumentalities such as firearms and explosives owe the highest degree of care and 
that utmost caution must be exercised in their care and custody); Jacobs v. Tyson, 407 S.E.2d 62, 
64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (classifying a firearm as an “inherently dangerous instrumentality” that 
imposes on users a duty to employ “exceptional precautions to prevent injury” and distinguishing 
firearms from other products that are capable of being used to inflict harm, such as knives and 
golf clubs, because of the unusual dangers presented by firearms (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Glean v. Smith, 156 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1967))).   
 106. This Article uses the term “proximate cause” to refer to scope of liability issues because 
it is the term most often used by courts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
AND EMOTIONAL HARM 6 Spec. Note (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) (explaining that while previous 
Restatements of Torts did not mention the term “proximate cause,” it is the term most often used 
by judges, lawyers, and legal scholars). The Restatement (Third) of Torts refers to the concept as 
“Scope of Liability,” which “more accurately describes the concerns of [the applicable chapter]: 
Tort law does not impose liability on an actor for all harm factually caused by the actor’s tortious 
conduct.” Id.  
 107. As Judge William Andrews famously said about proximate cause in his dissent in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, “What we . . . mean by the word ‘proximate’ is that, because 
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace 
a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.” 162 N.E. 99, 
103 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Similarly, Dean William Prosser observed 
about duty that it “is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which 
lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection” and is merely “a shorthand statement 
of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 101, § 53.   
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in the particular circumstances at issue? 108  
Invoking proximate cause and duty as immunity shields in stolen gun 
cases—without ever reaching the issue of the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s conduct—amounts to a judicial declaration that public policy 
does not support requiring gun owners and sellers to act reasonably to 
secure guns from theft. While, for reasons suggested earlier, the cases do 
not directly invoke the Second Amendment,109 it is the most viable 
explanation underlying the refusal to evaluate the reasonableness of 
conduct leading to gun thefts.  
To the extent anything resembling a legal test exists for determining 
the existence of a tort duty or proximate cause, it is “reasonable 
foreseeability” of the harm.110 In the context of criminal acts, section 
302B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “An act or an 
omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of 
the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though 
such conduct is criminal.”111 Section 448 specifically addresses 
proximate cause, providing that criminal acts by third persons are 
generally considered superseding causes “unless the actor at the time of 
his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that 
such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail 
himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.”112 
                                                                                                                     
 108. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 101, § 53 (“[T]he question of what is ‘proximate’ and 
that of duty are fundamentally the same: whether the interests of the plaintiff are to be protected 
against the particular invasion by the defendant’s conduct.”). The intertwining of duty and 
proximate cause is so complete that, as the Prosser and Keeton hornbook observes, it is possible 
to restate every question involving proximate cause in terms of whether the defendant owed a 
duty to protect the plaintiff from the harm that occurred. See id. § 42. 
 109. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. 
e (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Currently, virtually all jurisdictions employ a foreseeability (or risk) 
standard for some range of scope of liability issues in negligence cases.”). 
 111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (AM. LAW INST. 1965). A comment to this 
section states that “[n]ormally the actor has much less reason to anticipate intentional misconduct” 
than merely negligent conduct. Id. § 302B cmt. d. However, another comment clarifies that a 
reasonable person is required to anticipate and guard against even criminal misconduct “where 
the actor’s own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of 
risk of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account.” Id. 
§ 302B cmt. e. The Restatement (Third) of Torts collapsed the sections from the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts relating to liability for negligent acts that facilitate harm, including criminal 
harm, by third parties into a section titled “Conduct That Is Negligent Because of the Prospect of 
Improper Conduct by the Plaintiff or a Third Party.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Section 19 provides: “The conduct 
of a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with or permits the 
improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party.” Id. 
 112. Id. § 448. 
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For the obvious policy reason that it seems unfair to hold an actor who 
was merely negligent responsible for another’s intentional criminal act, 
courts traditionally have been more likely to treat criminal acts as 
superseding causes than other types of intervening forces. Nevertheless, 
as the above Restatement sections and a large body of case law 
indicate,113 liability is appropriate when the criminal act was within the 
scope of the original risk. Liability is commonly imposed in the area of 
inadequate security on business premises that facilitates a criminal 
attack,114 against defendants who leave keys in automobiles when the 
vehicles are stolen and involved in crashes,115 and in a diverse array of 
other situations where an original negligent actor created a risk of a 
subsequent criminal act.116 
Significantly, the advent of comparative responsibility brought on by 
the abrogation of joint and several liability in most states has substantially 
undermined the fairness rationale for holding that criminal acts facilitated 
by negligence are superseding causes, so much so that the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts suggests that a separate body of law for intervening and 
superseding causes is no longer needed.117 Because fact finders in most 
states are now asked to apportion responsibility among multiple 
defendants on a percentage basis, it is no longer a concern that a less-
                                                                                                                     
 113. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.   
 114. See, e.g., Silva v. Showcase Cinemas Concessions of Dedham, Inc., 736 F.2d 810, 812–
13 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the defendant’s failure to adequately patrol premises was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s stabbing); Kroger Co. v. Knox, 98 So. 3d 441, 442–43 (Miss. 
2012) (reasoning that a business has a duty to exercise reasonable care in securing its parking lot 
against the criminal actions of third parties if “an atmosphere of violence exist[ed] on the 
premises”); Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 768 (La. 1999) (reasoning that if 
the foreseeability and gravity of harm are high, a business has a duty to protect patrons from the 
criminal actions of third parties in the parking lot); McClung v. Delta Square, Ltd., 937 S.W.2d 
891, 902 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that businesses have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect 
customers from criminal attacks in parking lots if the criminal acts are reasonably foreseeable).  
 115.   See generally Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Liability for Personal Injury or 
Property Damage Caused by Unauthorized Use of Automobile Which Had Been Parked with Keys 
Removed from Ignition, 70 A.L.R.4th 276 (2000) (showing a collection of cases with this issue).  
 116. See, e.g., Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443, 451–52 (Ky. 1991) (holding that even if 
the spark that ignited trash left to accumulate next to building was intentional, the resulting fire 
could be found to be foreseeable); Garceau v. Engel, 210 N.W. 608, 608 (Minn. 1926) (holding 
the defendant who leased space in the plaintiff’s jewelry store was liable for leaving a key in the 
door when she went on vacation, resulting in a burglary); Christensen v. Epley, 585 P.2d 416, 
419, 422 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the defendant who took a dangerous juvenile into 
custody could be liable for failing to restrain him when a stabbing death occurred after he 
escaped).  
 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. 
a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Were it not for the long history of intervening and superseding causes 
playing a significant role in limiting the scope of liability, this Section [pertaining to intervening 
and superseding causes] would not be necessary.”). 
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culpable actor will be held responsible for the entirety of the harm.118  
Meanwhile, a review of existing case law demonstrates the elaborate 
lengths to which courts have gone to avoid placing responsibility on gun 
owners to secure from theft the only legal consumer product designed to 
kill people. Chronologically and perhaps symbolically, an appropriate 
point of departure is Romero v. National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc., an 
action asserting negligence in failing to secure a gun that was stolen in a 
burglary from the organization’s national headquarters and used to 
murder plaintiff’s decedent in a robbery.119 A jury returned a verdict for 
the plaintiff, but the trial court granted the NRA’s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.120 In affirming the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, the court of appeals concluded that the 
events were too “extraordinary and unforeseeable,” opining that it would 
require a “prophecy” to have predicted their occurrence.121 No prophecy 
would have been required, however, had the court not misapplied 
fundamental scope of liability principles. The court suggested that 
reasonable foreseeability could be established only if the defendant could 
have foreseen each of the following events:   
[1] Lowe’s [the NRA employee] storage of the weapon, [2] 
a burglary of the annex, [3] a search of Lowe’s desk, [4] 
discovery of his hidden closet key, [5] a search of the closet, 
[6] discovery of the gun and ammunition, [7] use of the gun 
in a robbery, [8] Gonzalez’[s] [the victim] resistance to the 
robbery, [9] and the ultimate murder of Gonzalez by 
someone not a party to the original burglary.122 
But the foreseeability question is not narrowly tailored to whether the 
actor could foresee this happening, then that, then this, then that, etc. It 
is basic “hornbook law”123 that “[i]f the actor’s conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither 
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in 
which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.”124 The 
                                                                                                                     
 118. See id. 
 119. 749 F.2d 77, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 120. Id. at 78–79.  
 121. Id. at 80–81. 
 122. Id. 
 123. As Professor Dan Dobbs explains in his Torts hornbook: “The defendant is liable for 
harms he negligently caused so long as a reasonable person in his position should have recognized 
or foreseen the general kind of harm the plaintiff suffered. He is not ordinarily relieved of liability 
merely because the manner of injury or its details were unforeseeable.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 189 (West 2000). 
 124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts omits a specific provision of this type, but explains in a comment:  
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relevant foreseeability question is whether the harm that resulted was 
within the scope of the original risk. The Restatement (Third) of Torts 
defines “scope of liability” (i.e., proximate cause) in precisely these 
terms: “An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the 
risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”125 Another way to frame the 
question is to ask whether the harm that occurred (a criminal harm with 
a stolen gun) is part of the risk that made an actor’s conduct (failing to 
adequately secure a gun from theft) negligent in the first place.126 
Romero is certainly disputable on the facts. It is not a clear-cut case of 
negligent conduct. But the case is important for adopting a flawed legal 
analysis that became a “go to” method for disposing of stolen gun cases. 
A more extreme case applying the same reasoning is Strever v. Cline, 
where the Montana Supreme Court relieved a gun owner of liability for 
leaving a loaded handgun in an unlocked vehicle on a public street.127 
Inside the vehicle in plain view were several items likely to attract the 
attention of thieves, including a radar detector, binoculars, fishing rod, 
                                                                                                                     
Mechanisms [i.e., the manner in which harm results] are important so long as 
they bear, in a general and reasonable way, on the risks that were created by the 
tortious conduct in the circumstances that existed at the time. Beyond that, details 
of the causal forces that concurred to cause the harm and their individual or 
combinational foreseeability are unimportant to the inquiry on the scope of 
liability. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. o (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010). In other words, the specific manner in which a harm occurred is important only 
in determining whether the harm that resulted was part of the risk that made the original conduct 
negligent.  
 125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010). 
 126. See id. § 29 cmt. b (“Courts should craft instructions that inform the jury that, for 
liability to be imposed, the harm that occurred must be one that results from the hazards that made 
the defendant’s conduct tortious in the first place.”). An illustration illuminates the relevant scope 
of the risk inquiry: 
Richard, a hunter, finishes his day in the field and stops at a friend’s house while 
walking home. His friend’s nine-year-old daughter, Kim, greets Richard, who 
hands his loaded shotgun to her as he enters the house. Kim drops the shotgun, 
which lands on her toe, breaking it. Although Richard is negligent for giving Kim 
his shotgun, the risk that makes Richard negligent is that Kim might shoot 
someone with the gun, not that she would drop it and hurt herself (the gun was 
neither especially heavy nor unwieldy). Kim’s broken toe is outside the scope of 
Richard’s liability, even though Richard’s tortious conduct was a factual cause 
of Kim’s harm. 
Id. § 29 cmt. d, illus. 3. 
 127. 924 P.2d 666, 667–68 (Mont. 1996).  
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and case of cassette tapes.128 Some boys entered the pickup truck and 
stole several of the items then returned looking for more items to steal.129 
Under the driver’s seat they found a bag containing a .22 caliber 
semiautomatic pistol and ammunition.130 As one of the boys attempted to 
remove the loaded magazine from the gun, it discharged, killing the 
eleven-year-old victim.131 
The court rejected liability on the basis that the sequence of events 
leading to the shooting was not sufficiently foreseeable to satisfy 
proximate cause.132 As in Romero, the court erred in focusing on the 
foreseeability of the precise chain of events rather than the general 
foreseeable risk of leaving a loaded gun in an unlocked vehicle on a 
public street.133 The court considered it significant that the boys came 
back to the vehicle twice.134 Who could have predicted that? And the 
shooter had smoked marijuana.135 Who could have known? The shooter 
was also waving the gun around recklessly.136 Actually, that aspect of the 
incident was all too foreseeable, as many fatal gun accidents involve 
minors behaving recklessly.137 But it is all beside the point because those 
were the wrong questions. The relevant question was whether someone 
being shot with a stolen gun is within the scope of the risk of leaving a 
loaded handgun in an unlocked vehicle on a public street.138  
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id. at 668.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 667. 
 132. Id. at 674. Judicial willingness to decide the question of foreseeability, which is usually 
a jury question, in stolen gun cases represents perhaps another tentacle of the right to be negligent.   
 133. The court explained: 
Here, not only were there two intervening criminal acts (two thefts from Susanj’s 
vehicle), but there was also an intervening grossly negligent act (Cline, high on 
marijuana, waving the stolen gun around with his finger on the trigger, then 
trying to unload the weapon). Accordingly, on these facts, we conclude that 
reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion—that the series of 
intervening acts which included two criminal acts and one grossly negligent act 
was reasonably unforeseeable and, thereby, cut off all liability on the part of 
Susanj for Robert Strever’s unfortunate death. 
Id. at 674. 
 134. See id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. See KLECK, supra note 22, at 321 (asserting that most fatal gun accidents involve 
adolescents and young adults engaging in reckless behavior). 
 138. For other stolen gun cases involving similar reasoning, see James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 
875, 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the homeowner was not liable when a high school 
student stole the homeowner’s gun and ammunition and then used the gun to murder three students 
at school because “[t]he law does not view as foreseeable the intentional criminal acts of a third 
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A case suggesting the unstated infiltration of the Second Amendment 
in this area is McGrane v. Cline.139 The gun used to commit the murder 
was either stolen from the defendants’ home by a friend of their sixteen-
year-old daughter or given to the assailant by the daughter who was left 
alone for the weekend while the parents were out of town.140 The parents 
left the gun unlocked in their master bedroom.141 The court refused to 
impose a duty even though it insisted that firearm thefts from homes are 
readily foreseeable142 but punted the case by concluding without 
elaboration that “there are too many issues of legitimate public debate 
concerning the private ownership and storage of firearms.”143 As already 
explained, however, there is no legitimate debate regarding the proper 
storage of firearms. All experts agree that guns should be securely stored 
to keep them out of the hands of unauthorized users.144 That leaves the 
court’s vague reference to debate over the “private ownership” of 
firearms, which inescapably implicates the Second Amendment.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
party when considering the position of the gun owner from whom the weapon is stolen”) and 
Finocchio v. Mahler, 37 S.W.3d 300, 303–04 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no proximate cause 
in reckless shooting by a teenager with gun stolen from a friend’s house, which was stored 
unlocked in a dresser drawer in the parents’ bedroom, because “the chain of causation included 
three acts over which the owner had no control”). 
 139. 973 P.2d 1092 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 1093–94. 
 142. See id. at 1094–95 (“[B]urglary is an all too common occurrence today, particularly in 
urban and suburban settings, and . . . firearms are frequently stolen during a burglary.”).  
 143. Id. at 1095. The court also noted, as have other courts, that the defendant parents had 
instructed their children not to enter their bedroom where the gun was kept and never to touch 
guns. Id. at 1094. If children could be counted on to follow parental instruction at all times, the 
world would be a much safer place. Unfortunately, as is common knowledge to anyone who has 
ever been a child or parent, children frequently do not follow parental instructions. Studies show 
that children are drawn to firearms and do not follow instructions to stay away from them. In one 
study, twenty-nine groups of boys ages eight to twelve were placed in a room with some toys. 
Geoffrey A. Jackman et al., Seeing Is Believing: What Do Boys Do When They Find a Real Gun?, 
107 PEDIATRICS 1247, 1247–48 (2001). Concealed in a cabinet was a .38 caliber semiautomatic 
handgun disabled from firing but equipped with a radio frequency device that would indicate to 
researchers watching from the next room if and when the trigger was pulled. Id. at 1248. The boys 
were told that they could play with the toys on top of the cabinet and could exit the room at any 
time if they had questions or a problem, but they were not told to explore the room or open any 
cabinets. Id. Nearly three-fourths of the groups opened the cabinet and found the gun within 
fifteen minutes. Id. at 1249. More than three-fourths of the groups that found the gun played with 
it. Id. Roughly half of the groups that handled the gun pulled the trigger. Id. More than 90% of 
the boys who handled the gun and pulled the trigger had received some form of previous gun 
safety instruction. Id. at 1248. Only one of the twenty-one groups that found the gun left the room 
to inform an adult. Id. 
 144. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
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Another case leaving little explanation for the holding other than 
deference to the Second Amendment is Holden v. Johnson,145 where a 
Connecticut court became the first to be squarely faced with a properly 
framed scope of liability argument. The defendant regularly kept a loaded 
semiautomatic handgun in his bedroom in a dresser next to a tray 
containing loose change.146 His daughter had a friend, Carl Johnson, with 
a criminal record, who regularly visited the premises.147 According to the 
complaint, the daughter “would, on occasion, retrieve change from the 
aforesaid tray, including retrieval of change to provide bus money to Carl 
Johnson[,] and [the daughter] was aware of the presence of said gun in 
the dresser and of Carl Johnson’s interest in the gun.”148 Johnson stole 
the gun during a visit and used it a week later to brutally murder the 
plaintiff’s decedent.149  
The court declined to impose liability because the defendant gun 
owner had no knowledge of Johnson’s dangerous propensities.150 
Plaintiff argued that was the wrong question, asserting, in line with the 
above discussion, “that the proper focus of the court’s attention should be 
whether the general risk was foreseeable-that is, whether the failure to 
properly store a firearm will create a foreseeable risk that the firearm will 
be stolen by a criminal and used for a criminal purpose.”151 The court did 
not dispute the argument, saying only that it was “hesitant to accept 
the . . . argument because, in effect, it would impose civil liability on 
every gun owner who fails to properly store a gun that is stolen and then 
used for criminal purposes,” and was “not persuaded that society is 
prepared to extend the duties of gun owners that far.”152 When a court 
rejects tort liability in a gun case not because of principles of tort law but 
because of what the court believes society is prepared to accept, it is hard 
to escape the conclusion that the court is deferring to notions of perceived 
Second Amendment rights. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 145. No. CV010811660, 2005 WL 1153739 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2005). 
 146. Id. at *3. 
 147. Id. at *1. 
 148. Id. at *2. 
 149. Id. at *1–2. The complaint alleged that Johnson and another man acted in concert to 
abduct the victim and “force[] him at gunpoint to surrender the keys to his vehicle, reveal his PIN 
number for automatic banking transactions, reenter his vehicle and accompany [them] as a 
prisoner while [they] withdrew cash from his bank account, and exit the vehicle,” at which point 
“[o]ne or both said defendants thereupon shot plaintiff’s decedent in the head, despite his pleas 
for his life, killing him and leaving him in a ditch by the highway on-ramp.” Id. at *1. 
 150. Id. at *4. 
 151. Id. at *6. The plaintiff relied on the argument as I had articulated it in a previous article. 
Id. at *6 n.1 (discussing plaintiff’s reliance on McClurg, Armed and Dangerous, supra note 7). 
 152. Id. at *6. 
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Legislation also protects the right of individuals to act negligently in 
securing firearms. In 2005, as part of the PLCAA153 and to advance 
similar goals of protecting the gun industry and gun rights,154 Congress 
passed the Child Safety Lock Act, which requires gun makers and sellers 
to furnish a “secure gun storage or safety device”155 with the sale of any 
handgun.156 While on the surface the Act would appear to be a 
meaningful step toward promoting firearms security, it in fact represented 
another advancement of the Second Amendment right to be negligent. As 
previously discussed, gun makers and sellers usually comply with the Act 
by providing easily thwarted childproofing locks not designed to prevent 
or deter theft.157 Nevertheless, if a gun owner opts to use the device 
(which is not mandated), the Act provides absolute tort immunity in state 
and federal courts for criminal harm caused by an unauthorized user who 
gains access to the firearm.158  
Thus, if A buys a handgun accompanied by an external trigger lock 
and uses the trigger lock, he is statutorily protected from liability as a 
matter of law in the event B steals the gun, removes the trigger lock, and 
criminally misuses the gun, without any opportunity for a fact finder to 
evaluate whether use of a trigger lock is a reasonable means to protect 
guns from theft. Illustrating this point is Estate of Arrington v. Michael, 
                                                                                                                     
 153. See Open Letter from Audrey Stucko, Deputy Assistant Dir., Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, to Federal Firearms Licensees—Child Safety Lock Act of 
2005 (Apr. 21, 2006), https://www.atf.gov/press/releases/2006/04/042106-openletter-ffl-child-
safety-locks.html (notifying federal firearms licensees that “Public Law 109-92 (119 Stat. 2095), 
the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, was enacted October 26, 2005,” and that section 
5 of the law is the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005). 
 154. In addition to promoting safe gun storage and preventing unauthorized access to 
firearms, a stated purpose of the Act was “to avoid hindering industry from supplying firearms to 
law abiding citizens for all lawful purposes, including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and 
competitive or recreational shooting.” Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 5(b), 119 Stat. 2095 (2005). 
 155. “[S]ecure gun storage or safety device” is defined as: 
(A) a device that, when installed on a firearm, is designed to prevent the firearm 
from being operated without first deactivating the device;  
(B) a device incorporated into the design of the firearm that is designed to prevent 
the operation of the firearm by anyone not having access to the device; or  
(C) a safe, gun safe, gun case, lock box, or other device that is designed to be or 
can be used to store a firearm and that is designed to be unlocked only by means 
of a key, a combination, or other similar means.  
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(34) (2012). 
 156. Id. § 922(z)(1) (making it unlawful for any importer, manufacturer, or dealer to sell or 
transfer a handgun without a secure gun storage or safety device as defined in id. § 921(a)(34)). 
 157. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.  
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(3) (granting tort immunity in state and federal courts for one who 
uses a “secure gun storage or safety device” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(34) in the event 
someone gains unauthorized access to the gun and criminally misuses it). 
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where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 
defendant, a police officer, was immune from suit under the Child Safety 
Lock Act because he affixed a trigger lock to a gun in his bedroom even 
though he left a key to the trigger lock in the same room.159 His son, who 
had a violent criminal history and was the subject of a restraining order,160 
took the gun and used it to murder his former partner.161 The plaintiff 
argued that a reasonable jury could find that storing the key near the lock 
was the “equivalent of not using the lock,”162 but the court held the matter 
was purely a question of law163 and that using the trigger lock conferred 
immunity under the Act.164  
2.  Thefts from Commercial Sellers 
Thousands of firearms are stolen each year from FFLs through both 
shoplifting and burglaries.165 In the first six months of 2014, thieves 
shoplifted nine assault rifles and another firearm in three separate incidents 
from the same Walmart Supercenter in Cordova, Tennessee, a suburb of 
Memphis.166 News reports, which include surveillance video, indicate 
assault rifles were plucked out of freestanding display cases on the open floor 
                                                                                                                     
 159. 738 F.3d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 2013). A week before the murder, the son came to the 
victim’s apartment and threatened to “cut her up” if she called the police, but she did so anyway. 
Id. at 602. Despite knowing of this incident, the defendant left his service weapon in his home, 
where the son maintained a room, and went on vacation to Florida. Id. at 601–02. The gun was 
stored in a locked bedroom with a trigger lock affixed to it. See id. at 602–03. Ammunition for 
the gun was hidden in a duffle bag in the same room. Id. at 603. The key to the trigger lock was 
stored in a dresser in the same room. Id. Prior to leaving on vacation, the defendant left a note 
behind for his son pleading with him to turn himself in, offering to pay him a $1500 bonus if he 
did so and explaining he would get a “courtesy break” because the defendant was a police officer. 
Id. at 602.  He also left behind a copy of the victim’s affidavit of the protective order violation. 
Id. After reading the affidavit, the son broke down the bedroom door and found the gun, 
ammunition, and the key to the trigger lock. Id. at 603. He used the gun to shoot the victim to 
death. Id.   
 160. The son had a long criminal record and history of violence against the victim. Id. at 601. 
He was subject to a protective order to stay away from her. Id. His father knew of this violent 
record, but allowed the son to live with him. Id.  
 161.  Id. at 603.  
 162. Id. at 606. 
 163. Id. at 605. 
 164. Id. at 606–07. 
 165. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. 
 166. See George Brown, Gun Thieves Hit Same Memphis Walmart for Third Time This Year, 
NEWS CHANNEL 3 (June 3, 2014, 3:05 PM), http://wreg.com/2014/06/03/gun-thieves-hit-same-
memphis-walmart-for-third-time-this-year/ (reporting that two assault rifles were stolen from the 
Cordova, Tennessee, Walmart on Jan. 27, 2014, seven others on Feb. 11, and one more on May 
28, and listing the nine stolen assault rifles as three Colt M4 Carbines, a Diamond Back DB-15, a 
DPM Panther Arms A-5, a Sigsauer 522, a Bushmaster XM15-e2s, and a Sigsauer Sigm400). 
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while the store was open.167 It is uncertain how the thieves were able to 
access the display cases, but one news report stated about the second theft: 
“According to a police report, a manager told officers that the gun [display] 
case was new and the keys were stuck to the back of the gun case.”168 As 
any merchant, including, no doubt, Walmart, can well attest, shoplifting is 
highly foreseeable.169  
Burglaries of gun stores are also common. An internet search for “gun 
store burglaries” turns up several incidents. A break-in at a gun store in Salina, 
Kansas resulted in the loss of more than 100 guns and a large quantity of 
ammunition.170 Thieves took forty guns in a burglary of a Mississippi gun 
store.171 A gun store in Dacula, Georgia was “cleaned . . . out” hours after a 
shipment of sixty-five guns had arrived and were put on display.172  
Rational risk–utility analysis commands the exercise of an extremely 
high amount of care on the part of commercial sellers to secure guns from 
theft, both during and after business hours. They maintain large 
inventories of firearms in one place and, as previously discussed, firearms 
are prime targets for thieves.173 The probability of guns being stolen is 
high and the gravity of the potential harm is multiplied by the large 
number of guns collected in one place. When a burglar enters a car or 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See id.; see also Jason Miles, Half Dozen Guns Stolen from Walmart, WMC ACTION 
NEWS 5 (Feb. 14, 2014, 5:03 AM), http://www.wmcactionnews5.com/story/24721323/half-
dozen-guns-stolen-from-walmart (reporting that “six ‘assault’ rifles were swiped from one of the 
glass displays, plus a seventh weapon”). 
 168. Did They Use a Key? 9 Guns Stolen from Walmart Gun Safe, LOCAL MEMPHIS (Feb. 27, 
2014, 10:17 PM), http://www.localmemphis.com/story/d/story/did-they-use-a-key-9-guns-
stolen-from-walmart-gun/61243/dlCYfBmYhka6AcBJwTVvyQ. 
 169. The National Association for Shoplifting Prevention offers these statistics: annual 
shoplifting losses exceed $13 billion, one in eleven Americans is a shoplifter, and “[m]ore than 
10 million people have been caught shoplifting in the last five years.” The Shoplifting Problem in 
the Nation, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SHOPLIFTING PREVENTION, http://www.shopliftingprevention.org/
what-we-do/learning-resource-center/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
 170. Large Number of Guns and Ammo Taken in Burglary, SALINA POST (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://salinapost.com/2014/04/15/large-number-of-guns-and-ammo-taken-in-burglary/ (reporting 
that “100–120 handguns, 8–20 semi-automatic rifles, 8–12 knives, and nearly $5,000 in 
ammunition” were stolen from Cleve’s Marine and Sporting Goods). 
 171. Angela Williams, 2 Charged in Gun Store Burglary, WAPT NEWS (Aug. 19, 2014, 8:12 
AM), http://www.wapt.com/news/central-mississippi/2-charged-in-gun-store-burglary/27610462 
(describing the arrest of two men for burglarizing a gun store in Kosciusko, Mississippi and 
including an embedded video showing the men prying open locked glass cases). 
 172. Kristi Reed, $75,000 Worth of Guns Stolen During Big Gun Armory Burglary, DACULA 
PATCH (Jan. 1, 2013), http://patch.com/georgia/dacula/75-000-worth-of-guns-stolen-during-big-
gun-armory-burglary#.VASQ3tF0ycx (explaining that the burglars “entered the store by 
smashing the front door glass, reaching through the bars and unlocking the door,” but also quoting 
the owner as stating that he had a double-keyed lock on the door until the fire marshal required 
him to replace the inside lock with a twist lock).  
 173. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
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home, he usually does not know in advance whether a gun will be found. 
When thieves target gun stores, it is because they are specifically intent 
on stealing guns.  
Nevertheless, with few exceptions, courts have shielded commercial 
gun sellers from responsibility for failing to safeguard their inventories 
from theft when stolen guns are used to inflict injury in a criminal attack. 
They accomplish this result in one of two ways: first, by traveling down 
the same wrong scope of liability path described above by demanding 
foreseeability of the precise chain of events,174 and, second, by distorting 
the nature and breadth of the duty entailed in practicing reasonable gun 
security.175 
Louria v. Brummett176 is an example of the former error. Two minors 
stole two shotguns from a K-Mart store and used the guns to shoot a 
deputy sheriff.177 The victim sued K-Mart, alleging a failure to take 
proper measures to secure the guns from theft.178 In holding that the 
alleged negligent storage was not a proximate cause of the shooting 
because the resulting crime was unforeseeable,179 the court stated: 
The minors committed their first crime by breaking into and 
stealing guns from K-Mart. . . . Secondly, the minors the 
following day broke into the Shinlever School. Finally, after 
resisting arrest, the minors shot and wounded officer Louria. 
For K-Mart to be liable, they would have had to foreseen a 
crime upon a crime . . . .180 
One judge concurred because he felt bound by precedent but recognized 
that the court’s view of foreseeability was too restrictive.181   
Analyzing foreseeability at the correct level of abstraction brings a 
different result, as seen in Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., in which a 
shooting victim sued the operator of a gun show.182 Four teenagers paid 
admission and twice entered the defendant’s gun show despite a policy 
prohibiting unsupervised minors.183 The boys stole several handguns, 
which, according to one of them, was “easy” because they were “just 
laying around” on tables.184 They used one of the guns to shoot the 
                                                                                                                     
 174. See supra notes 123–38 and accompanying text. 
 175. See infra notes 189–95 and accompanying text.  
 176. 916 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 177. Id. at 929. 
 178. Id. at 930.  
 179. Id. at 931. 
 180. Id. at 930–31. 
 181. Id. at 931 (Franks, J., concurring). 
 182. 637 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
 183. Id. at 406. 
 184. Id. at 407. 
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plaintiff, leaving him paralyzed.185 The court found that the defendant 
owed a duty to prevent unsupervised minors from entering a gun show 
where unsecured firearms are displayed and that the proximate cause 
chain was not severed by the intervening criminals’ acts.186 The court 
framed the scope of the risk question accurately, asking: “Should the 
defendants have foreseen that children who successfully steal a firearm 
and purchase suitable ammunition at its gun show would use the loaded 
firearm in the pursuit of criminal activity?”187 Reasonable minds, the 
court said, could answer this question affirmatively.188 
A Maryland case arising from a retail gun theft skewed the analysis in 
a different fashion—by exaggerating the nature of the burden and duty in 
negligent storage cases. In Valentine v. On Target, Inc., two men stole 
several handguns from a retail gun dealer.189 Two months later, an 
unknown assailant used one of the guns to murder plaintiffs’ decedent.190 
A wrongful death action asserted that the gun store owed a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in displaying handguns to prevent theft.191 The 
majority analyzed the issue in terms of duty (noting correctly that there 
is no significant difference between a duty and proximate cause 
analysis192) but rejected liability based on a red herring. The court 
characterized the duty as one to protect the “world at large” from 
criminals and concluded that such a broad duty would impose a 
“tremendous burden” on gun sellers while providing only a “hypothetical 
benefit to the public.”193  
Certainly, a duty to protect the world at large from criminals would 
impose an enormous burden with only a small chance of success, but that 
is not the relevant duty in negligent gun security cases. The duty is close-
fitting and narrowly contained: the duty to safeguard a dangerous 
instrumentality. Possessors of firearms, whether they are individuals or 
commercial entities, are far and away the most efficient cost-avoiders in 
the equation.194 A concurring judge in Valentine highlighted the court’s 
defective reasoning on this point, stating that liability would not entail an 
                                                                                                                     
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at 409–10. 
 187. Id. at 410. 
 188. Id. 
 189. 727 A.2d 947, 948 (Md. Ct. App. 1999). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 949. 
 193. Id. at 951. 
 194. See Herland v. Izatt, 345 P.3d 661, 674 (Utah 2015) (indicating that public policy 
supports placing injury costs on the party “best situated to take reasonable precautions to avoid 
injury” and that in unauthorized access to firearm cases, imposition of a duty on the gun owner is 
justified because “the burden on gun owners to properly restrict access to their firearms is 
relatively slight” as compared to the risk). 
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indefinite duty to protect society from harm but “would merely impose 
upon a store owner a duty to exercise ordinary care in the storage and 
display of handguns held out for sale to the public.”195   
Any potential for the common law regarding the obligations of 
commercial gun sellers to evolve was cut off in 2013 when the Alaska 
Supreme Court held in Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe that the 
PLCAA categorically bars claims of negligent security against FFLs for 
harm resulting from a stolen gun.196 While the impact of Coxe could be 
downplayed on the basis that it is a decision of a single state supreme 
court, the court’s opinion appears to be a correct interpretation of the 
PLCAA.   
The estate of a man killed with a rifle taken from a Juneau gun store 
sued the store and owner alleging negligent security.197 The defendants 
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the PLCAA immunized the 
defendants from negligent security claims.198 The court agreed, holding 
that the PLCAA bars all claims against gun manufacturers, distributors, 
and retail FFLs resulting from the criminal misuse of a firearm, subject 
to the six exceptions enumerated in the PLCAA.199 “A plain reading of 
[the Act],” the court said, “supports a prohibition on general negligence 
actions—including negligence with concurrent causation.”200 
Concluding that firearm thefts do not fall under any of the statutory 
exceptions, the court said that in a bolded subheading: “Theft of a firearm 
does not support liability under claims excepted from the PLCAA.”201 
The implications of the holding are large. Assume the following 
hypothetical: 
                                                                                                                     
 195. Valentine, 727 A.2d at 954–55 (Raker, J., concurring) (agreeing with the result because 
there was no evidence as to how the guns were stored); see also Kimbler v. Stillwell, 717 P.2d 
1223, 1224–25 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing dismissal of the complaint in a case in which a 
shotgun stolen from a store in a burglary was used to murder plaintiff’s decedent, disagreeing 
with the trial court ruling that the plaintiff sought to impose a broad duty on the defendant to 
prevent criminal acts by third parties, and stating that “[d]efendant’s duty . . . is that of a merchant 
to display merchandise in a safe manner”). 
 196. 295 P.3d 380, 384 (Alaska 2013). 
 197. Id. at 385.  
 198. Id.  
 199. See id. at 388; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2012) (defining a prohibited “qualified 
civil liability action” as including any claim against a manufacturer or seller of guns for damages 
resulting from the unlawful misuse of a gun, subject to six enumerated exceptions).  
 200. Coxe, 295 P.3d at 386; see also id. at 388 (“In light of the PLCAA’s text and legislative 
history, Congress’s purpose and intent was to bar any qualified civil liability action not falling 
within a statutory exception. Our conclusion is supported by other courts that have held the 
PLCAA bars simple negligence claims.”).  
 201. Id. at 393. A factual dispute existed as to whether the gun was acquired by sale or 
through theft. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the rifle was stolen or 
sold. Id. at 392–93. 
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Joe is a federally licensed firearms dealer who operates a gun 
store with an inventory of 350 firearms, most of which are 
handguns. The firearms are not secured either during or after 
hours. Many of the guns are in unlocked glass display cases, 
plainly visible through the outside windows. The store has 
no alarm system. On a Friday afternoon, Joe flips the “Open” 
sign to “Closed,” locks the door, and goes home. That night 
thieves remove an unsecured window air conditioning unit, 
enter through the opening, and steal 150 handguns, several 
of which begin showing up at crime scenes within a few 
months.  
Joe would bear no legal responsibility for the injuries under the Coxe 
holding even assuming he acted unreasonably in securing the 
inventory.202 Change the facts. Anxious to get home after a long week, 
Joe simply forgets to lock the door when closing the store. The thieves 
open the unlocked door, walk in, and clean the store out. Liability? Not 
under the PLCAA and Coxe. Change the facts again. Joe gets drunk and 
leaves the door wide open when he leaves for the night. Liability? It 
would not appear so. While Joe’s conduct under these facts arguably 
constitutes gross negligence or recklessness, the PLCAA contains no 
exception to immunity for such conduct. 
Gun thefts from retailers are an example of how the PLCAA connects 
up the “Imprimatur through Inaction” and “Imprimatur through Action” 
threads of the right to be negligent. The primary exception to immunity 
from suit under the PLCAA is known as the “predicate exception,” 
defined as an action in which a manufacturer or seller “knowingly 
violated a state or federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing” of 
firearms and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm.203 Statutes 
imposing premises and operational security requirements on retail gun 
sellers most likely would qualify as statutes “applicable to the sale or 
marketing” of firearms; thus, violations of such statutes could give rise to 
a claim under the predicate exception. As noted, however, as of this 
writing, only nine states and the District of Columbia have such 
statutes.204 
                                                                                                                     
 202. ATF recommends that firearms dealers secure window air conditioning units in cages. 
See ATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO FFLS, supra note 87, at 9 (“Evaluate other unsecured openings. 
Does your premises have air conditioning units in open windows or a hole in an exterior wall? 
These units are easily removed, and many theft entries are made in this way.”).   
 203. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). The exception is called the predicate exception because the 
violation of an applicable statute is a necessary predicate for maintaining an action. 
 204. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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III.  THE TRICKLE-DOWN EFFECT OF THE RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT 
Part II explained how the absence of legal requirements for firearms 
security at both the federal and state level, as well as affirmative 
protections of negligent conduct by courts and the federal Child Safety 
Lock Act and PLCAA, have created a de facto right to be negligent, 
rooted in the Second Amendment, in protecting firearms from theft. This 
final Part suggests that the trickle-down effect of this state of the law is 
the under-deterrence of reasonable conduct and a societal mindset that it 
is permissible to act irresponsibly in keeping and safeguarding firearms.  
Risk–utility analysis is grounded in the economic deterrence model of 
tort law. To achieve optimal deterrence, the deterrence model holds that 
tort liability rules are (or should be) designed to induce actors to expend 
resources on safer behavior up to the point where the marginal cost of 
increased safety exceeds the marginal reduction in injury costs.205 In 
theory, economically efficient tort rules deter risky behavior that is not 
cost-justified. If actors are required to internalize the costs of their 
negligent conduct, they will be incentivized to invest effort and money in 
safer conduct at appropriate levels.206  
Gun makers, gun sellers, and gun owners, however, have never been 
required to internalize the costs of harm caused by guns, with the result 
that they are grossly under-deterred from investing in safer 
manufacturing, distribution, or possession practices. Those costs are 
enormous. Much has been written about them.207 In short, they include 
more than 30,000 lives lost each year;208 roughly 80,000 annual nonfatal 
intentional and unintentional injuries;209 lost productivity and earnings of 
                                                                                                                     
 205. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort 
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 865–72 (1981).  
 206. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 16–17 (1987).  
 207. See generally PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS (2002) 
(detailing the repercussions of gun violence).  
 208. See supra note 97.  
 209. Data tabulated from the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control’s Web-Based 
Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS) showed 64,034 violence-related 
nonfatal gunshot injuries in 2012. See Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System 
(WISQARS), Nonfatal Injury Reports 2001–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html (select “Violent-Related” for intent of 
injury option, “Firearm” for cause of injury option, and “2012 to 2012” for “Year(s) of Report”; 
then follow “Submit Request” hyperlink). In the same year, an additional 17,362 persons were 
injured in nonfatal unintentional shootings. Id. (select “Unintentional” for intent of injury option, 
“Firearm” for cause of injury option, and “2012 to 2012” for “Year(s) of Report”; then follow 
“Submit Request” hyperlink). 
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gunshot victims;210 extraordinary medical costs borne largely by the 
government (and, hence, taxpayers);211 lost quality of life;212 costs of 
administering the criminal justice system and incarcerating gun 
criminals;213 police and emergency services;214 fear;215 and grief.216  
The deterrence model has been subject to decades of critique by those 
who assert that a variety of practical factors make it impossible to achieve 
                                                                                                                     
 210. Professors Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig estimated the lost lifetime earnings and value 
of household services of each fatal gunshot victim to be between $460,000 and $580,000 after 
adjusting the value downward to account for the fact that most firearms victims are of low 
socioeconomic status and educational attainment. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 207, at 77.  
 211. A study of 2010 emergency department visits and hospital admissions for shooting 
victims estimated the direct annual costs of medical treatment for firearms injuries to be $629 
million per year. EMBRY M. HOWELL & PETER ABRAHAM, URBAN INST., THE HOSPITAL COSTS OF 
FIREARMS ASSAULTS 4 tbl.1 (2013). The study found that victims of firearm assaults are 
disproportionately uninsured, with the result that most of the treatment cost for their injuries is 
shifted to taxpayers. Id. at 5. Only 16% of the treatment costs were covered by private insurance, 
while 52% of costs were covered by government insurance, such as Medicaid, and 28% were 
incurred by persons who were uninsured. Id. at 6 fig.7. 
 212. The Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, an independent nonprofit 
organization that provides research through grants or contracts to a long list of state and federal 
government agencies, estimated the total cost of gun violence in 2010 to be as high as $174 billion. 
Ted R. Miller, The Cost of Firearm Violence, CHILDREN’S SAFETY NETWORK (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.childrenssafetynetwork.org/sites/childrenssafetynetwork.org/files/TheCostofGunVio
lence.pdf. The study estimated the societal cost of a single fatal firearms assault to exceed $5 
million, the largest portion of which was for lost quality of life. Id. The estimated cost per fatal 
firearm assault broke down as follows: 
Work Loss: $1,552,381 
Medical Care: $28,741 
Mental Health: $10,883 
Emergency Transport: $544 
Police: $2,119 
Criminal Justice: $395,221 
Insurance Claims Processing: $2,361 
Employer Cost: $8,980 
Quality of Life (pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life for shooting 
victims and their families): $3,093,750 
Total Cost Per Fatal Firearm Assault: $5,094,980 
Id.  
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See generally Mark Warr, Fear of Crime in the United States: Avenues for Research 
and Policy, in 4 MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS OF CRIME & JUSTICE 451, 452 (David Duffee ed., 
2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04i.pdf (study of crime fear quoting an 
assertion by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice that 
“[t]he most damaging of the effects of violent crime is fear and that fear must not be belittled”).  
 216. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of 
Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (2005) (discussing studies showing the 
disabling effects of grief resulting from the traumatic death of a loved one). 
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optimal deterrence.217 But as Professor Gary Schwartz observed, critics 
have often ignored the crucial distinction between the “strong deterrence” 
model and the “modest deterrence” model,218 which could be renamed as 
the “it works perfectly” and “it works, but not perfectly” models. While 
conceding that optimal deterrence may be impossible to achieve, 
Professor Schwartz conducted a sector-by-sector analysis (e.g., 
automobile accidents, medical malpractice, and products liability) of 
available data and information, and concluded there is adequate support 
for the effectiveness of the modest deterrence model.219 
Reviewing criticisms of the deterrence model catalogued by Professor 
Schwartz, it appears likely that in the context of stolen guns, the prospect 
of tort liability would deter gun owners and gun sellers from unreasonable 
conduct with respect to firearms gun security. First, gun storage and 
security measures, or lack thereof, are the consequence of conscious 
choices. Access to unsecured guns does not usually result from acts of 
momentary inadvertence, which, as critics note, are unlikely to be 
deterred by the threat of tort liability.220 Second, the critique that tort law 
is not a “necessary cause” to deterring risky conduct because people can 
be expected to act with due care out of moral obligation221 is not strong 
with respect to a significant segment of gun sellers and owners. Firearms 
storage studies222 and theft data223 demonstrate that a substantial 
percentage of gun owners do not feel or exercise a moral responsibility 
to secure guns from unauthorized users.  
Third, the critique that tort law is not a “sufficient cause” for 
deterrence because individual tortfeasors do not feel the effects of 
liability due to liability insurance224 does not apply. Liability insurance 
rarely enters the picture in gun theft cases, in large part because the law 
so strongly favors gun sellers and owners that few lawsuits are ever 
brought. If homeowner insurers were on the hook for injuries resulting 
from negligent gun security, it would very likely enhance the deterrent 
impact of the threat of tort liability. In an article about mandatory liability 
insurance for gun owners, Professors Stephen Gilles and Nelson Lund 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381–87 (1994) (discussing common criticisms of the economic 
deterrence model). 
 218. Id. at 387–89. 
 219. Id. at 422–23. 
 220. See id. at 385–86 (discussing the argument that tort liability does not deter inadvertent 
negligence). 
 221. Id. at 382–83 (discussing the argument that society can rely on moral obligations to 
deter risk-creating conduct). 
 222. See infra notes 237–42 and accompanying text (discussing firearms storage studies). 
 223. See supra notes 34–49 and accompanying text (discussing firearms theft data). 
 224. See Schwartz, supra note 217, at 382–83. 
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(while arguing that mandatory coverage for intentional shootings would 
be unconstitutional) noted that the benefits of mandatory insurance would 
include educating gun owners about safe storage and giving them an 
incentive in the form of lower premiums to follow safe storage 
practices.225 Similar responses would be likely to follow the availability 
of non-mandatory liability insurance if a realistic possibility of liability 
existed. Currently, homeowner insurers do not even seek information 
about gun ownership or storage practices from policy applicants, 
although they do inquire about other household risks, such as animals, 
swimming pools, and trampolines.226 In some states, insurers are 
statutorily barred from denying coverage for firearms liability or charging 
higher premiums based on household firearm possession.227 
Another criticism of the deterrent model is that concern for personal 
safety is a sufficient deterrent to engaging in risk-creating conduct,228 but 
that concern is also absent with respect to firearms security practices. 
Professor Schwartz pointed out that the concern for personal safety is a 
strong motivating factor mostly in the area of transportation.229 Most 
people drive safely primarily because they do not want to suffer the 
consequences of an accident, not because of a fear of tort liability. While 
concern about family safety motivates many, but by no means all, gun 
owners to responsibly secure their firearms, gun owners do not take steps 
to safely secure guns out of a concern for self-preservation. To the 
contrary, one of the principal arguments against safe gun storage is that a 
securely stored gun will not be readily available when needed for self-
protection.230  
 
                                                                                                                     
 225. See Stephen G. Gilles & Nelson Lund, Insurance as Gun Control?, REGULATION, Fall 
2013, at 38, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2013/9/regv36n3-
1n.pdf. 
 226. An insurance industry expert consulted for this Article, regarding whether insurance 
companies inquire about firearms on homeowner policy application forms, surveyed a number of 
agents, company executives, and consultants and reported back that, with one exception, none had 
seen such a question from a liability perspective. The exception was an insurer that asked about 
assault weapons until, reportedly, the NRA complained to the state insurance department. Email 
from Bill Wilson, Director, Virtual Univ., Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers of Am., to Andrew Jay 
McClurg, (July 11, 2014, 9:34 CST) (on file with author). 
 227. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 626.9541(g)(4) (2015) (classifying as “unfair discrimination” 
denying coverage or charging a higher premium to lawful firearms owners); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-
24-30.1 (2015) (prohibiting insurance companies from excluding or denying coverage because 
the insured, insured’s family member, or insured’s employee lawfully keeps or carries firearms 
on the insured’s property). 
 228. Schwartz, supra note 217, at 383 (discussing the argument that risky conduct is 
sufficiently deterred by a concern for personal safety). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, the deterrence model is critiqued on the basis that many 
individuals act without knowledge that their conduct could subject them 
to a lawsuit.231 My involvement in the firearms policy debate for more 
than two decades has taught me that no group of Americans is more in 
tune with or knowledgeable about their issue realm than gun owners, in 
large part because of the effective job that the blogosphere and gun 
lobbying organizations do in getting the word out about developments, 
legal and otherwise, in the area. Knowledge of the existence of potential 
tort liability for harm caused with stolen guns would likely be 
disseminated quickly and in a saturated fashion. 
Accordingly, there are reasons to believe a credible threat of tort 
liability would incentivize lawful gun owners and sellers to exercise 
reasonable care in keeping guns out of the hands of thieves. Similarly, an 
affirmative mandate of reasonable gun security practices in the form of 
legislative or regulatory rules could be expected to have a deterrent effect 
on lawful gun owners and sellers, as most could be expected to follow the 
law.232 But in the topsy-turvy world of guns in America, the legal system 
has essentially abandoned the deterrence model as a means for promoting 
safe conduct in securing the most dangerous product. As seen throughout 
this Article, the law imposes almost no expectations on the most efficient 
cost-avoider—gun possessors. 
A byproduct of this state of affairs is a lax attitude by many gun 
owners toward their responsibility for safeguarding firearms from theft. 
Anecdotally, in many discussions regarding safe firearms storage, in class 
discussions, at presentations, and informally, I am frequently surprised 
by the low degree of obligation many gun owners feel toward protecting 
guns from access by unauthorized users. Many of these discussions occur 
in my law school firearms policy seminar course. Most of the students 
who enroll in the course are strong believers in gun rights. They are 
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible people, except, for some of them, 
when it comes to firearms security. As an example, during a class 
discussion of the Holden case, where the gun owner left a loaded pistol 
in a dresser, which was stolen by his daughter’s friend and used for 
murder,233 a student spoke up and said, “I leave my loaded gun on top of 
my nightstand so I can get to it in hurry.” The comment led to a colloquy 
along the following lines: 
Me: Like, including right now, when you’re in class? 
Student: Uh-huh. 
                                                                                                                     
 231. See Schwartz, supra note 217, at 386–87. 
 232. Obviously, criminals and other illegal gun owners would be unlikely to be deterred 
either by the threat of tort liability or affirmative legislative duties.  
 233. See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text. 
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Me: Do you have roommates? 
Student: Yes. 
Me: Do they bring friends over? 
Student: Yes. 
Me: Have units in your apartment building ever been 
burglarized? 
Student: All the time. That’s one reason I have the gun. 
Me: Don’t you think it’s risky to leave a loaded handgun 
laying around in plain view? Maybe even negligent?234 
One empirical indicator of the trickle-down impact on the right to be 
negligent is simply the massive number of guns stolen each year, as 
discussed in Part I.235 Unfortunately, without more data, there is no way 
of knowing whether gun thefts are going up, down, or staying the same. 
Nor, given the fact that many stolen guns are never reported,236 can 
comparisons be drawn to thefts of other valuable products, such as 
automobiles, which presumably get reported in nearly all instances. 
A stronger empirical indicator can be found in the dismal patterns of 
firearms storage in households documented by numerous studies.237 Most 
of the studies involve surveys of parents conducted at pediatrics 
                                                                                                                     
 234. To the student’s credit, she told me later in the semester that she was looking into buying 
a gun safe. It is important to emphasize that many gun owners are highly responsible. Following 
a class discussion similar to the one recounted in the text, I stopped by the law school security 
desk to talk with the campus police officer. One of my students had mentioned that the officer is 
a champion marksman whose picture hangs prominently on the wall of one of the largest gun 
stores in Memphis. I asked the officer her views on safe gun storage, not knowing what to expect 
as a response. She launched into a passionate argument about the high degree of responsibility 
gun owners bear to protect guns from theft, offering as an example a recent vacation trip to 
Florida. She explained that she had lawfully transported her handgun there by plane and rented a 
car on arrival. Like many states, Florida has a reciprocity statute honoring handgun carry permits 
from other states. See FLA. STAT. § 790.015 (2015) (allowing nonresidents to carry a concealed 
weapon if, among other restrictions, the nonresident is from a state that honors Florida’s concealed 
weapon laws and licenses). The officer’s personal vehicle in Memphis is equipped with a secure 
gun lockbox bolted to the trunk. The rental car, of course, had no such lockbox. She explained 
that before entering any premises prohibiting the carrying of firearms, she used her police 
handcuffs—“and not the ones with a universal key that many people could have”—to secure the 
gun, via the trigger guard, to the vehicle’s chassis in the locked trunk. Relating this story to my 
students, some were surprised by what they saw as “extraordinary care.” I disagreed, expressing 
the opinion that, given the magnitude of the risk, it was “reasonable care under the circumstances.”   
 235. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 237. See generally McClurg, Armed and Dangerous, supra note 7, at 1190–1200 (discussing 
ten studies of gun storage practices). 
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clinics.238 While the findings vary, studies have found that as many as 
50% of all handguns are stored unlocked,239 that ammunition is stored 
unlocked in approximately one-third of households,240 and that as many 
as 1.6 million children live in a home with at least one loaded and 
unlocked firearm.241 A 2007 national study determined that just over one-
third of parents in households with guns and children stored their guns 
safely.242 Because the studies are survey-based, it is reasonable to believe 
they understate the magnitude of the deficiencies in household storage 
practices because many respondents presumably would not want to 
confess to strangers that they store guns or ammunition in ways that 
endanger children.  
Behavioral law and economics theory may also suggest that the right 
to be negligent with respect to firearms security has crept into the public 
psyche. In their groundbreaking article, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, the authors hypothesized that in determining the 
probability of events in making negligence determinations, juries are 
subject to hindsight bias.243 This occurs because jurors are required to 
assess the probability that a particular harm would follow from the 
defendant’s act already knowing that the harm did in fact occur.244 The 
result is that jurors may overestimate the probability of harm in 
conducting a cost–benefit analysis of the defendant’s conduct, leading to 
the imposition of too much tort liability.245 The same phenomenon 
presumably would affect judges as well in ruling on dispositive motions 
such as motions for dismissal, summary judgment, or directed verdict. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 238. The gun lobby has fought, with some success, to prohibit doctors from asking patients 
about gun ownership. See James Hamblin, The Question Doctors Can’t Ask, ATLANTIC (Aug. 11, 
2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/08/doctors-cant-ask-about-
guns/375566/ (discussing a Florida statute that prohibits doctors from inquiring about gun 
ownership or discussing gun safety with patients, a lawsuit by Florida physicians challenging the 
statute as a First Amendment violation, the decision of a federal district court declaring the statute 
unconstitutional, and the 2–1 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals reversing the district court 
and upholding the statute). 
 239. See Yvonne D. Senturia et al., Children’s Household Exposure to Guns: A Pediatric 
Practice-Based Survey, 93 PEDIATRICS 469, 471 (1994). 
 240. See id. (stating that 32% of gun owners reported storing ammunition unlocked). 
 241. Gail Stennies et al., Firearm Storage Practices and Children in the Home, United 
States, 1994, 153 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 586, 588 (1999). 
 242. Robert H. DuRant et al., Firearm Ownership and Storage Patterns Among Families 
with Children Who Receive Well-Child Care in Pediatric Offices, 119 PEDIATRICS e1271, e1275 
& tbl.2 (2007) (reporting these figures and citing studies).  
 243. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1523–24 (1998). 
 244. Id. at 1523. 
 245. Id. at 1524. 
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But in the area of harm resulting from access to unsecured firearms, 
the case law belies these assumptions. Consider Gordon v. Hoffman, 
where the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to overturn a jury verdict 
that found no liability on the part of a gun owner who left an unsecured, 
loaded rifle in a house occupied only by his fifteen-year-old daughter and 
several unrelated younger children (ages five through thirteen) for whom 
she was babysitting.246 The fifteen-year-old removed the loaded rifle 
from a closet, assuming it to be unloaded, to show it to the other 
children.247 She then left the room and in a struggle between two boys for 
possession of the rifle, the gun discharged, killing plaintiff’s five-year-
old child.248 Although the trial record was incomplete, the court said the 
jury apparently believed that the defendant was negligent but that the 
“negligence was not a direct cause” of the injury.249 Such a conclusion 
would be curious inasmuch as Minnesota, like all states, has long 
recognized that foreseeable intervening causes, even criminal acts, do not 
break the chain of causation.250  
Given that the jurors not only knew such a harm had happened in the 
case before them but were most likely aware that such incidents happen 
regularly (they occur hundreds of times each year251), the jurors certainly 
did not appear to be overestimating probability. They either 
underestimated it or possibly did not care about it one way or another 
based on a belief that people should not bear a responsibility to lock up 
their guns. In either situation, it is difficult to defend the verdict under 
any rational cost–benefit analysis. How could one not be held responsible 
for leaving a loaded, accessible firearm in a house full of unsupervised 
children? The risk that made the conduct negligent is exactly what 
happened. As a dissenting justice observed, “It is hard to imagine a more 
volatile or potentially disastrous situation than that created by this 
defendant.”252  
                                                                                                                     
 246. 303 N.W.2d 250, 250–52 (Minn. 1981). 
 247. Id. at 250–51. 
 248. Id. at 251. 
 249. Id. at 252. 
 250. See, e.g., Raleigh v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 275 N.W.2d 572, 574, 576 (Minn. 1978) (finding 
no error in the jury verdict for the student victim against the school district because a fellow 
student’s misconduct in slitting the victim’s wrist was foreseeable when school district, aware of 
existing racial tensions, failed to exercise ordinary care in supervising the students attending a 
documentary movie); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc., 245 N.W.2d 
186, 189–90 (Minn. 1976) (reversing the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict to a corporation whose stolen truck was involved in an accident because the jury could 
have found that theft was a foreseeable result of an employee leaving the keys in the truck’s 
ignition in a high crime rate area). 
 251. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 252. Gordon, 303 N.W.2d at 253 (Otis, J., dissenting). 
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Other examples of juries returning victories for defendants in cases 
involving objectively unreasonable gun security exist,253 and this Article 
has discussed several cases where judges acted similarly. While the cases 
do not empirically prove anything, they certainly do not suggest, as 
behavioral law and economics theory would predict, that juries or judges 
are overestimating probabilities of harm in unauthorized gun access 
situations with the result of imposing more liability.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the disheartening level of responsibility that 
the law, and through it, the American public, have come to accept from 
individual gun owners and retail gun sellers to safeguard firearms from 
theft. Despite the fact that hundreds-of-thousands of guns are stolen each 
year254 and that a high percentage of crime guns are the product of 
theft,255 the U.S. legal system is bankrupt of tools to deter dangerous, 
unreasonable firearms security. The law imposes virtually no obligation 
on the most efficient cost-avoider in the equation: possessors of firearms. 
Cases have been discussed in which judges and juries refused to hold 
responsible even grossly negligent defendants who left, with deadly 
results, loaded handguns unguarded, unlocked, and readily accessible to 
criminals and other unauthorized users. 
That these conditions are the result of unwarranted deference to 
expansive views of the Second Amendment can be seen not only in the 
absence of legislation (except in a small number of states) mandating 
firearms security,256 but also in federal legislation, such as the PLCAA 
and the Child Safety Lock Act, that affirmatively protects—expressly in 
the name of the Second Amendment—negligent conduct that facilitates 
gun thefts.257 Common law courts have been just as deferential. This 
Article showed how, in case after case, courts have distorted fundamental 
scope of liability principles to avoid imposing legal responsibility 
commensurate with the risk of possessing firearms to safeguard them 
from thieves.258  
                                                                                                                     
 253. See Blackwell v. Cantrell, 315 S.E.2d 29, 30, 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the jury 
verdict finding no negligence for grandparents who kept a loaded pistol in a dresser drawer in 
their bedroom, which their grandchildren accessed with the result that one grandchild shot the 
other); Oldham v. Nerolich, 452 N.E.2d 225, 226 (Mass. 1983) (affirming the jury verdict finding 
no negligence for the landowner whose nephew and eleven-year-old friend, playing on the porch, 
entered the landowner’s unlocked house and found a loaded rifle in the closet with the result that 
the nephew shot his friend). 
 254. 2012 ATF STOLEN GUNS REPORT, supra note 8, at 5–6; see supra notes 34–43 and 
accompanying text.  
 255. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.  
 256. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.   
 257. See supra notes 12–15, 153–64, 196–201 and accompanying text.   
 258. See supra notes 119–52 and accompanying text.   
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As explained in the Introduction, the issue of stolen guns is just a 
sliver of a much larger issue. As a nation, our legal system has made the 
irrational, not simply unwise, choice to confer near complete immunity 
from responsibility on those who make, purvey, and possess the only 
legal product designed and intended to kill and injure people. This Article 
explained how rather than seeking optimal deterrence of injury-causing 
behavior, U.S. law may have the perverse effect of actually encouraging 
it. 
During the writing of this Article, a lawyer sought my counsel in a 
case in which his client was shot with a stolen assault rifle. An employer 
had allowed an employee to keep the firearm, unsecured, on the 
employer’s premises. A co-employee with a violent felony record stole 
the gun and used it in the shooting. The lawyer contacted me after a 
hearing on a motion for summary judgment, explaining that he was 
baffled by the cold reception he received from the trial judge. “I don’t 
understand it. Is it me or the law?” he asked. “It’s the law,” I said. “I call 
it the Second Amendment right to be negligent.” 
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